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The purpose of this research is to examine the outer space governance regime and to identify 
key governance deficits which are arguably the main reason for the far-reaching proliferation 
of space debris in the outer space commons. To this end, the research initially inspects two 
of the existing global commons – the maritime and polar regions – their governing regimes, 
and the regulatory, legal, and political challenges encountered in each. The discussion on the 
connection between global governance deficits and the environmental tragedies within these 
domains aims to establish the conceptual foundation of this study. Based on this foundation, 
the research discusses legislative and regulatory dimensions of outer space governance and 
international responses to the challenges facing the outer space commons. It concludes with 
the examination of the space debris problem and potential policy responses to address this 
global environmental tragedy. In this regard, in the light of Ostrom’s design principles, an 
international treaty on space environment protection, a financial programme in managing the 
cost of debris removal programmes and maintenance of spatial resources, and an 
international space agency to coordinate these fields and provide substantial cooperation 
between space actors, are offered as fundamental steps to prevent the tragedy in outer space 
– the common heritage of mankind. Therefore, this research intends to contribute to the 
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1.1. Background  
As the globe becomes more interdependent, the governance of the global commons is of 
great importance for achieving sustainable and secure development. In addition, deepening 
financial, political, and cultural globalisation has boosted the level of activities in the global 
commons. Hence, better consistency, coordination, and collective action at the international 
level, based on the international standards and laws developed by international bodies, are 
essential in establishing effective global governance regimes. However, national, regional, 
and international arrangements and policies have not kept pace with these global activities. 
Governance of the global commons constitutes a particular feature of international 
environmental governance and it has been conventionally identified as those fields of the 
world that fall outside national authority and to which all states have access (OHCHR, 2013). 
International law identifies global commons as the oceans and high seas, Outer Space, the 
Atmosphere, and the Polar Regions (OHCHR, 2013). These resource fields are guided by the 
notion of the shared heritage of humankind. More recently, reserves of interest or assets to 
the prosperity of the societies of nations – such as biodiversity, groundwater, and rain forests 
– have been added to the conventional global commons. However, some define the commons 
even more comprehensively to include cyberspace, information, and peace (David, 2000). 
The World Conservation Strategy defines the commons as “a tract of land or water owned or 
used by the members of a society, and it comprises the open oceans, the atmosphere, 
Antarctica, and the resources originate within these areas” (WCS, 1980, p. 52). Similarly, 
according to the United Nations (UN), the ‘Global Commons’ refers to “resources and 
territories beyond any state’s appropriation and political hegemony”, and it categorises the 
global commons as the High Seas, the Atmosphere, Antarctica, and Outer Space (UNEP, 2015). 
In addition to their geographical and conceptual differences, these arenas, particularly outer 
space and the oceans, share many common features. They are both joint supranational 
territories where national armed forces cannot settle and subsist (Brown, 2012).  
Historically, accessing the resources discovered within these territories (such as the ocean 
floor) has been challenging, but the potential resource yields have been plentiful. Yet, the 
progress of technology and science during the 20th and 21st centuries and the intensified 
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demand for resources have led to a rise in activities in the global commons, such as aviation, 
flight, navigation, fisheries, drilling, bioprospecting, scientific research, and the placing of 
submarine cables. Meanwhile, our planet is confronting large-scale, inter-related 
environmental and security problems, such as global warming, orbital debris, climate change, 
militarisation of space and the high seas, and rapid environmental degradation in the Arctic 
regions. If these problems prevail, the conditions are likely to deteriorate. Ultimately, this will 
have negative impact on the global commons’ function to deliver various ecological benefits 
for human welfare.  
The international community recognises the necessity to preserve these resource domains 
for international peace and stability. A number of international conventions and agreements 
aimed at governing the global commons have been implemented. These efforts include the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982; the Treaty on Principles 
governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (OST) of 1967; the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) of 1959 that aimed at ensuring the preservation and protection 
of the Antarctic flora and fauna; a collection of international environmental conventions that 
focus on the protection and administration of the atmosphere and various pollution and 
depletion related problems, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 
1992.  
Although the nature and structure of these commons are different, common theoretical and 
practical approaches can be used when they are evaluated and regulated under the realm of 
the global commons. It is therefore necessary to establish a common governance method in 
such environments where the concept of communalism is imperative. Hence, over the years, 
attempts have been made to regulate the above-mentioned regions through a common sense 
of governance. However, as Shearing and Wood emphasise, such regime efforts have 
contended with a number of “governance deficits”, namely “deficits in community self-
direction, deficits of community capital and of regulation” (Shearing & Wood, 2003, p. 207). 
These deficits result in imbalances in the determination of, and access to, common assets. 
They are also the main cause of the absence of effective regulation and governance (Shearing 
& Wood, 2003). These deficits lead to the so-called “tragedy” of the commons, as outlined by 
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Garett Hardin (1968). This “tragedy” includes overfishing and pollution in the oceans, 
meltdown in the polar regions, and debris in outer space. 
1.2. Problem Statement  
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, there have been thousands of spacecrafts launched. As a 
consequence, excessive amounts of debris have been left in the Earth orbit. This debris 
generally consists of abandoned and non-operational satellites, upper stages of the launchers 
that used to deliver spacecraft, fragmented debris that are produced as a result of collisions 
in space, and fragments created by explosions during ASAT tests (Alby, 2015). According to 
NASA, the number of trackable space debris is more than a half million, and they travel at 
speeds of up to 8 miles per second in Earth orbits (Garcia, 2013). At that velocity, space debris 
can pose various threats both on the ground and in orbit. The primary danger of space debris 
lies in the possibility of further collisions and the resulting operational problems in active 
spacecrafts, space shuttles or space stations. Due to its hyper velocity, even a small collision 
can cause catastrophic results in space. As Garcia (2013) argues, debris as small as one 
centimetre is capable of penetrating components of the existing space station. Moreover, as 
Donald Kessler argues, a collision in space can become a self-sustaining collision which 
generates thousands of extra debris by colliding into other space objects (Kessler & Burton, 
1978). Although covering a wide-range of issues concerning outer space, the OST regime has 
not managed to provide effective governance and control nor has it managed to establish 
collective action between space-faring states. Therefore, the international community fails to 
prevent the so-called “tragedy” in space, with some, such as Lawrence Roberts (1992), 
arguing that the regime is partly responsible for creating the “tragedy”. 
1.3. Research Objective  
The purpose of this research is to examine the outer space governance regime and to identify 
key governance deficits which are, as argued here, the main reason for the far-reaching 
proliferation of space debris in the outer space commons. To this end, the research initially 
inspects two of the existing global commons – the maritime and polar regions – their 
governing regimes, and the regulatory, legal, and political challenges encountered along the 
way. The discussion on the connection between global governance deficits and the 
environmental tragedies within these domains establishes the conceptual foundation of this 
study. Based on this foundation, the research discusses legislative and regulatory dimensions 
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of outer space governance and international responses to the challenges facing the outer 
space commons. It concludes with the examination of the space debris problem and potential 
policy responses to address this global environmental tragedy. Therefore, this research 
intends to contribute to the understanding of the space debris problem, its consequences for 
global welfare, and fruitful avenues for addressing its challenges.  
1.4. Theoretical Framework   
In this discussion the researcher draws on the conceptual ideas of Garett Hardin’s “The 
Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). His model engages with the ultimate overexploitation or 
degradation of open resources used in the commons. Proceeding from an economic model of 
a shared resource system where he sees irresponsible exploitation contradicts the common 
good and results in environmental destruction, which he refers to as “the tragedy” (Hardin, 
1968). Although Hardin focused on the issue of overpopulation and its consequences, the 
dominant legacy of his work has been the concept of common property resource 
management (Feeny , et al., 1990).  
The Tragedy of the Commons has been subject to comprehensive discussion in relation to 
global environmental issues. For instance, Erin A. Clancy discussed the case of open seas and 
the importance of sustainable development in preserving the global commons (1998), 
Stephen Gardiner again focused on the case of climate change and the effects of global 
agreements (2004), Scott Ervin (1984) explored the case of outer space, and studies were also 
conducted on the impact of technological developments on the public knowledge commons 
(David, 2000). For purposes of this enquiry, the researcher focuses on the issue of space debris 
as an environmental tragedy within the outer space commons. As part of this discussion, two 
of the most prominent global commons and the tragedies therein are examined, in order to 
identify commonalities between outer space and terrestrial commons.  
To avoid these tragedies, Hardin (Hardin, 1968) suggested that the commons should either 
be privatised or managed as public property so that the rights of use and access could be 
allocated. A decade later, he offered two solutions for preserving the commons; namely 
private initiatives and/or socialism where publicly-owned property managed by a central 
authority (Hardin, 1978). He argued that these are the only ways for sustaining and preserving 
the commons. The basis of privatisation of the commons emerges as opposed to the Locke 
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model of governance and the prohibition of private property. Similar to Hardin, classical 
liberals argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons was privatising resources by 
allowing individuals to acquire property rights vis-à-vis the commons. Robert Smith also 
supported the idea of privatisation in order to enforce an effective and sustainable regime in 
the commons (Smith, 1981). This research on the other hand argues that preventing the large-
scale tragedies is only possible when private, commercial, state-centred, and international 
community entities cooperate and establish norms, institutions, and a system of international 
relations that can integrate global changes. In this regard, Elinor Ostrom’s design principles 
(2010) (2003) are elaborated within the context of global commons governance to provide a 
polycentric system that is most capable of dealing these tragedies, particularly the tragedy in 
outer space.  
Hardin’s ideas were criticised by various scholars, Jensen in particular claimed that the 
tragedy of commons was used as a justification for privatisation and private ownership 
(Jensen, 2006). Partha Dasgupta also criticised Hardin’s work as historically ill-informed for 
not considering the “demographic transition” and for neglecting to differentiate between 
common property and open-access resources (Dasgupta, 2001). Similarly, Carl Dahlman 
argued that the economic model espoused by Hardin was weak in historical terms as it 
misrepresented the successful common property usage models in history (Dahlman, 1991). 
Furthermore, he emphasised Hardin’s negative approach regarding the roles of values and 
ideals in finding a solution to issues in common resources within local communities. Keith 
Steward again argued that the tragedy could not be averted by privatising the commons as 
the very nature of governance was embedded in a strong public domain (Stewart, 2001). 
Instead, he argued in favour of expanding the role of public domain in environmental 
governance. This, he thought was a prerequisite for effective mechanisms so as to avert 
tragedies in the global commons (Stewart, 2001).  
Ostrom argued that Hardin’s idea of the tragedies of commons is correct but not unavoidable. 
She argued that, in order to prevent the tragedy, global institutions needed to be established 
or reregulated to overcome rising global challenges that face humanity (Ostrom, et al., 1999). 
She also proposed (Ostrom, et al., 2003) a system based on global attempts as well as 
collective action, to cope with the global environmental change, particularly with the emission 
of greenhouse gases (Ostrom, 2010). Similar approaches can be facilitated in avoiding the 
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tragedy in global commons. Sadeh too argued that preventing this tragedy requires either a 
main governing authority to create rules, verify compliance, and take action against 
violations, or less formal forms of self-regulation and self-restraint to secure sustainability of 
the space environment (Sadeh, 2015).   
Despite the myriad proposals offered by scholars, various challenges confront the governance 
of global commons. The structures dealing with the global commons are complex and argued 
to be broken. Many of the previous agreements have not kept up with environmental changes 
and are out of date, and do not comprehensively deliberate the consequences of human 
activities on global environmental security, ecosystems and other vital aspects. In addition, 
many recent activities do not have specified frameworks to be governed in accordance with 
international rules and standards. For instance, in the international waters, bioprospecting is 
not entirely controlled by UNCLOS, and various activities like deep-sea mining and research 
are expected to increase in the near future. Moreover, similar activities in outer space, such 
as asteroid mining and space tourism are yet to be legally identified and regulated. 
1.5. Research Question  
The governance of the global commons encompasses a complex structure of political and 
legal affairs, thus the defining feature of the first question of this research must be far-
reaching. Therefore, the first question aims at examining the key characteristics of global 
maritime and polar governance in legal and institutional dimensions. This examination 
includes the existing institutional and regulative arrangements as well as the challenges 
emerging from the activities of governing in these domains. The second question focuses on 
outer space governance and security, and the issue of space debris. It is practically 
inconvenient to address these issues within the same question. Therefore, it is necessary to 
have additional sub-questions to address these inter-connected issues adequately. The 
research questions can be formulated as follows:  
a) How are global commons governed and what are the key challenges confronting 
governance? 
a1) How has the international community responded to the challenges confronting 
the governance of global commons?  
b) How is outer space governed?  
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b1) What does security mean for outer space governance?  
b2) How has the international community responded to a growing space debris threat 
in the orbital environment?  
The second chapter of this research is dedicated to answering the first two questions which 
are twofold as it refers to the nature of global commons governance as well as challenges that 
emerge from governing measures. Global commons in this regard refers to the ocean and 
polar governance regimes which host the largest commercial, economic, and political 
activities of the global commons.  
Chapters 3 and 4 engage the remaining three questions. Moreover, they aim to provide a 
more comprehensive analysis of governance including analysis of its legal framework and 
institutional structure. The reason for emphasising the term security in the latter is that it is 
historically and politically significant to the understanding of cooperation in outer space as 
well as providing an important perspective in offering appropriate solutions to the challenges 
concerning environmental security in space.   
1.6. Research Approach 
The research questions are explored through a desktop analysis of available research. The 
literature includes academic sources, policy papers and reports, legal documents, various 
online resources, as well as other forms of grey literature. The sections related to the 
governance structure of determined domains are mainly conducted based on the information 
received from grey literature, namely online resources, institutional regulations, and reports. 
Existing literature on the global commons governing regimes are subject to detailed review 
and analysis. In this regard, the study also uses an explanatory research method in providing 
the historical and institutional background of a number of organisations. This information, 
including international legally binding and non-binding agreements, principles, declarations, 
codes of conducts, guidelines, and other measures were obtained through online resources 
such as UN websites, and evaluated in terms of their feasibility and compatibility with the 
research structure.  
With respect to sections on the challenges occurring within the given commons regimes, the 
research utilised journal articles and various online resources. The research questions in this 
minor dissertation are of a truly interdisciplinary nature. It involved complex environmental 
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issues which had to be considered both from ecological and legal perspectives. For instance, 
in the second chapter, the ecological literature is harnessed in analysing problems such as 
ocean acidification and arctic melting. The sections exploring environmental tragedies 
interlink the ecological and scientific literature with legal and political discussions as well as 
existing initiatives to address these environmental tragedies. Policy initiatives from various 
national, regional, and international organisations also had to be considered in the final 
sections of every chapter.  
The main reason for choosing this method is because it offers an appropriate approach to 
answer the given questions with respect to global commons and outer space. Yet, the selected 
topic and the research method posed various challenges to the researcher throughout the 
study, and these are considered in the next section.  
1.7. Limitations   
The research topic presented various challenges given its very complex and inter-related 
disciplinary nature. First of all, as the research topic was broad, it required a wide and 
comprehensive literature scan. In addition to legal and political discussions on the global 
commons subject, the area of environmental security further broadened the scope of this 
research. In the initial phase, the researcher considered and included cyberspace and the 
atmosphere as two of the global commons emphasised in the second chapter. The purpose 
of having such a broad focus was to provide a comprehensive foundation for the discussion 
on the outer space commons. Before long however, it became clear that reflecting 
institutional, legal, and political developments within so many different domains had shifted 
the focus of this study and resulted in a conceptual disorder. Therefore, only two of these 
global commons (the oceans and polar regions) have been subject to discussion to narrow 
down the research focus and prevent conceptual proliferation.  
Secondly, the research is comprised of legal, political, and environmental discussions and 
information. Each of these issues has given rise to numerous research debates and data across 
many disciplinary fields. Thus, providing a theoretical foundation in order to link these 
disciplines and to demonstrate a common understanding of the matter was quite a 
challenging task. Given the researcher’s law enforcement background, lack of training in the 
fields of international law and natural science has also been an obstacle the research had to 
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contend with. Moreover, investigating new global domains, other than outer space, and their 
legal and environmental state has been quite challenging. The researcher experienced a 
substantial lack of prior research, particularly with regards to legal and scientific aspects of 
other global commons. However, the researcher attempted to address this particular 
challenge by attending various courses before drafting this research.  
This research enquiry focuses on the nature of and challenges confronting the governance of 
the global commons. This requires that the concept of governance is considered and 
theoretical approaches to governance briefly considered.  Yet the lack of training on the 
theoretical side of governance required further research in the field. By incorporating various 
literature, the researcher has attempted to address this issue.  
1.8. Conclusion  
The stability and sustainability of the global commons and particularly the outer space 
commons are critical to the provision of international security. However, there have always 
been difficulties with respect to governing and regulating these commons. These difficulties, 
in general, have resulted in growing environmental, political and legal crises that directly 
affect international stability. Space debris, in particular, is the most emergent environmental 
crisis that endangers space assets and the sustainability of the space environment. Even 
though there are a number of promising responses to the problems posed by space debris, 
effective mechanisms to implement these responses are yet to be established. It is, therefore, 
necessary to investigate the deficiencies associated with existing prevention measures taken 
by the international community and to analyse similar practices employed in other global 
commons. At this juncture, this research initially aims to illustrate the nature of governance 
of global commons, as well as the inadequacies within these governance regimes that led to 
various environmental tragedies. To this end, in chapter 2, the study purposes to provide an 
extensive analysis of legal and policy implications of existing problems in maritime and polar 
regimes. Based on this extensive foundation, in chapter 3 and 4 it discusses outer space 
governance and the issue of space debris. In chapter 5 it concludes with conceptual 
discussions and policy proposals founded on the principles provided by Elinor Ostrom. Within 
this chapter, the researcher has attempted to provide a theoretical and pragmatic 
background for this research by examining the global commons regimes and the concept of 
the tragedy of the commons concept.  
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2. Governing Security in Global Commons 
This chapter reviews the nature of the existing global regimes governing the commons, and 
their limitations. Present issues threatening the security and sustainability of these domains 
will be identified and assessed, including their significance for global and environmental 
security. The previous, present, and future mitigation efforts and prevention policies and 
initiatives from the international community will be discussed. Finally, an overall evaluation 
and illustration of the literature on this matter will be offered. Even though the security focus 
in this chapter is predominantly based on environmental concerns, it is important to 
emphasise that environmental security is interconnected with economic, social, and military 
security within these domains. Therefore, the chapter will cover a truly multidisciplinary topic, 
including legal, ecological, and political aspects, to provide an overview of key facets of 
governance of the global commons. 
2.1. Maritime Regimes  
2.1.1. Law of the Sea 
The ocean is one of the classic global commons and the primary avenue for international trade 
since ancient times. Norms and rules for governing access and use of the oceans have 
developed and changed over time (Stang, 2013). Only very recently has there been an 
international body of governance established to control activities of states in the oceans. The 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS - 1956) is the primary international treaty that 
governs the relationships between states with respect to boundaries, navigation, and coastal 
water jurisdictions. The convention was opened for signature only in 1982 and came into 
force in 1994 (UNCLOS, 2013). Although this is relatively recent, it is based on centuries-old 
practices, customary laws, and fundamental principles such as freedom of the seas 
(Economist, 2014).  
The UN convention itself is very comprehensive. Its main focus is on dispute resolution 
(Clancy, 1998). The objective of UNCLOS, as summarised in its foreword, is to create “a legal 
order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will 
promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of 
their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and 
preservation of the marine environment” (UN, 1982). The convention included the 
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responsibilities and rights of each state with respect to natural resources within the limits of 
their sovereignty as well as within international jurisdiction (Clancy, 1998). In other words, it 
created new regional boundaries both in sovereign and in international waters. UNCLOS also 
established central legislative and judicial bodies to implement the rules and principles of its 
provisions (Treves, 1998).  
On paper, UNCLOS appears to be a substantial step towards peaceful, secure, and sustainable 
waters for the nations of the world. However, in practice, it has achieved far less than it 
aspired to. The provisions and the amendments of the treaty have failed to preserve the 
common areas. Moreover, some of them served to contradict the principle of “common 
heritage of mankind”, the very theory that the convention is inspired by. Ultimately, the 
convention’s shortcomings have made possible over-exploitation, which caused significant 
degradation and deterioration of common resources (Clancy, 1998) resulting in the tragedy 
of the maritime commons.   
2.1.2. Jurisdictional Encroachment – Exclusive Economic Zone  
In terms of its jurisdictional approach, UNCLOS sets out two levels of jurisdiction in order to 
establish territories and states’ responsibilities and rights within them. The first degree of 
jurisdiction is the “Territorial Sea”, where states maintain sovereignty in coastal waters up to 
12 miles from their coastlines (UN, 1982). The second is the “Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ), 
where states enjoy the right to extract resources up to 200 miles from their coasts (Denmark, 
2010). The EEZ constitutes roughly 35 per cent of the entire ocean space and covers more 
than 90 percent of all exploitable fish supplies (Dux, 2010). This “jurisdictional 
encroachment”, as referred to by Erin Clancy, causes a number of serious consequences 
(Clancy, 1998).   
Firstly, even though states have no absolute sovereignty over the EEZ, it causes a particular 
threat to the marine commons as it grants somewhat sovereign rights to the coastal state for 
exploiting the living and non-living resources therein, as well promoting maximum 
exploitation (Wijkman, 1982). In fact, most of the ecological problems within the maritime 
commons originate from the EEZ (Economist, 2014). These include acidification and pollution 
that derive from the land and the 200-mile limit. According to National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), roughly 1.4 billion pounds of trash enter the ocean 
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annually (NOAA, 2011). Moreover, irresponsible and ill-regulated offshore drilling creates 
various forms of pollution that have negative impacts on the marine ecosystem as well as on 
human life (OCENA, 2016). The concept of the EEZ also endangers specially protected marine 
species and habitats (Dux, 2010). The convention falls short in addressing these problems. 
Partly, this is because it is inadequate in terms of conservation since most of the convention 
was negotiated in the 1970-80s when these issues were rarely taken into account (Economist, 
2014).  It also has no means to apply sanctions or enforce them accordingly. Another reason 
is that the states that play a very active role within the EEZ, such as the United States (US), 
refuse to sign the convention.  
Secondly, existing arrangements of the EEZ are being abused by the rise of maritime actors 
who are increasingly using their naval forces to impose permanent claims over disputed 
waters (Denmark, 2010). China’s claim over the artificial islands in the South China Sea is a 
striking example, where its actions pose drastic consequences for the legitimacy of the 
convention, as well as for regional security and stability. The implications of China’s 
understanding also result in an extremely problematic practice for other disputed maritime 
commons (Johnson, 2014). Yet, the Chinese government claims that other states must receive 
authorisation before entering its EEZ, whereas, as indicated in UNCLOS, the EEZ remains a 
global waterway which other parties are able to traverse freely (UN, 1982). 
The EEZ has always been a source of dispute amongst states over maritime waters. The Cod 
Wars between the UK and Iceland over the fishery stocks is a well-known example of such 
conflicts (Mitchell, 1976). The dispute over the Svalbard island between Russia and Norway 
or the crisis between Eastern Mediterranean countries over the discovered oil and gas 
reserves are also two of the critical cases in this regard (Stocker, 2012). These conflicts affect 
the economic, energy, and political security of countries involved, as well as indicating the 
significance of UNCLOS’s EEZ encroachment.   
The implications of the EEZ provisions of UNCLOS causes practical challenges in dealing with 
other problems in open waters, such as piracy. According to the Statistics Portal, 4,837 
incidences of piracy have been reported since 2009 (Statista, 2017). Even though UNCLOS sets 
out a legal framework applicable to preventing piracy, it remains insufficient in the application 
of a consistent penal code in the seizure, arrest and prosecution of pirates captured on the 
EEZ. It has also not succeeded in establishing a universal exercise of jurisdiction within the 
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EEZ, or in providing a framework to address practical problems such as transferring of 
suspected pirates for prosecution (Surbun, 2010).   
2.1.3. UNCLOS on the High Seas  
In terms of its approach to the high seas, UNCLOS considers international waters, including 
living and non-living sources and the ocean bed as free and excluded from the EEZ (UN, 1982). 
This means that the common areas are governed according to the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind (CHM), and the benefits obtained therein are vested to all nations of the 
world. The convention also specifies that the “high seas shall be reserved for peaceful 
purposes” and activities shall be conducted in a way that promotes development and 
cooperation for international relations and trade (UN, 1982). These activities include a 
number of traditional uses (fishing, telecommunication, military manoeuvres, and scientific 
research), as well as emerging modern activities such as ocean bed mining.  
In the light of these provisions, it is clear that the main focus in international waters is not 
preservation, but exploitation. The convention not only promotes uncontrolled economic 
growth, but also feeds into controversies in common waters. Such unrestricted economic 
growth demands natural resources, which can be extracted through the abuse of maritime 
commons. In turn, an unprecedented chain reaction causes various ecological, political, and 
regional security problems. In some cases, ecological issues directly evolve into political crises.  
For instance, with the rapid melting of ice in the Arctic region (due to irresponsible 
consumption of fossil fuels and deforestation), the long-inaccessible territory becomes more 
accessible for economic activities such as fishing, mining, oil/gas production, and shipping 
(Foizee, 2016). Hence, the area is becoming increasingly attractive to industrial powers. In 
addition to Arctic states, many other non-Arctic actors, including China, are now in a rush to 
exploit the Arctic’s resources (Ross, 2017). Consequently, some of the Arctic countries are 
shifting towards militarisation in order to claim their so-called share. The regulations provided 
by the existing framework fail to oversee and counter the increased attention and 
militarisation of the Arctic. A new agreement is required, which includes specific regulations 




While the Arctic ice melts, the condition of the high seas is worsening. According to the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), more than 85 percent of the world’s fisheries were 
being exploited beyond their sustainable limits (FAO, 2014). Besides overfishing, pollution is 
an ever-growing problem for the marine ecosystem. It is estimated that the ocean will contain 
1 tonne of plastic for every 3 tonnes of fish by 2025, and by 2050 there will be more plastic 
than fish in the high seas (MacArthur, 2016). In addition to pollution, the accumulation of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases the acid levels of ocean water and harms global 
reef habitats (Caldeira, 2016). Finally, there is a rising trend in deep sea mining that could 
pose serious environmental risks and consequences for marine ecosystems over immense 
ocean areas (Kraniotis & Griffis, 1996). Unlike in the EEZ case, the high seas cannot be 
preserved by assigning sovereign rights over them. Under international law, all marine 
resources are open to all nations due to the CHM principle. Therefore, international rules and 
institutions determine the state of the marine commons. However, UNCLOS and its related 
institutions fail to address emerging problems.   
2.1.4. Tackling the Tragedy 
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the UNCLOS has established a number of 
administrative and regulatory conventions and institutions to govern sectoral activities in the 
oceans, such as fisheries, ocean bed mining and shipping. To this end, specialised bodies and 
agreements have been established to accommodate the gaps in the treaty. For example, the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995 aimed to provide a framework for cooperation in the 
conservation and management of fishery stocks (UN, 2013). The International Seabed 
Authority (ISA) was established in 1994 to organise and regulate mining activities beneath 
international waters (ISA, 2017). Although, it has not yet been tested, ISA is more up-to-date 
than most of the international mining protocols.  The Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) meets twice a year in order to facilitate the implementation of 
UNCLOS and to offer recommendations on the matters related to continental shelf limits 
(CLCS, 2012). Finally, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea was established as an 
independent judicial body to adjudicate disputes occurring as a result of the interpretation 
and implementation of the Convention (ITLOS, 2017).  
Such agreements notwithstanding, there is insufficient interaction between these bodies. 
Unlike many other global agreements established in the past several decades, UNCLOS does 
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not have a separate secretariat tasked with monitoring its implementation. It also has no 
built-in compliance instruments to observe the performance of states and apply sanctions 
when necessary (GOC, 2015). In addition, in most cases UNCLOS depends on existing 
organisations for enforcement and monitoring (Economist, 2014). The International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), for instance, operates a regulatory framework for international shipping 
activities. It created a universally adopted forum that is responsible for not only the safety 
and security of shipping but also the prevention of marine pollution through shipping 
activities (Oxman, 1995). The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) provides global and 
regional assessments and reports on ecological and environmental matters. The UN Office of 
Legal Affairs (OLA) supports UNCLOS in promoting and strengthening implementation of the 
international legal order for the high seas. Many other UN institutions and conventions, 
mandated to regulate respective sectoral activities, are affiliated or related to UNCLOS. In 
terms of enforcement, UNCLOS continues to depend on the principle of “flag state 
responsibility”1 as the default position (GOC, 2015).  
Over time, international ocean governance has become a “bewildering proliferation of 
authorities, often with competing and overlapping mandates but for the most part lacking 
any real regulatory or enforcement power” (GOC, 2015). At the international level, as Klein 
argues, accountability is inadequate and states are almost free to operate outside of rules 
and measures (Klein, 2014). Transparency and compliance-monitoring are inadequate, and 
very few instruments evaluate or control the cumulative effects of various industrial 
involvements on the ocean environment. It is obvious that the risks facing the oceans today 
are global and ever more serious. International cooperation is crucial to overcome these 
problems (GOC, 2015). However, the current governance system for the high seas is not 
effective and does not offer a promising long-term sustainability agenda. In this context, the 
ocean commons exemplify the “tragedy of the commons”, where individual users abuse a 
commonly owned property for their short-term interests, but actually harm their own long-
term interests as a result. The ocean version of this tragedy will not be restricted to a limited 
body of water of water but rather leads to a never-ending circle of destruction to the entire 
ocean ecosystem, and consequently the whole planet.             
                                                     
1 Flag state responsibility refers to the principle that all ships must be registered under a national, flag and are 
subject to the legal jurisdiction of that country on the high seas. Article 91 of UNCLOS 
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2.1.5. Final Remarks on UNCLOS 
The major consensus in the literature is that the convention is inadequate – like other 
international governing bodies for commons – in solving the environmental and security 
issues like pollution, conservation, overfishing, and various challenges in the international 
waters and polar regions (Stang, 2013). Churchill discusses how the convention fails to 
provide efficient governance and leadership primarily due to continuing non-compliance with 
many of its provisions. He further stresses that the degree of non-compliance destabilises the 
reliability and legitimacy of the convention (Churchill, 2012). Johnson also emphasises the 
growing problem of non-compliance with UNCLOS by highlighting the problems in the Arctic 
region and in the South China Sea (Johnson, 2014).   
In contrast, some other scholars claim that UNCLOS has empirically been confirmed to be 
successful (UNCLOSDEBATE, 2015). These claims mainly revolve around the consistency of 
states’ practices over the provisions. For instance, Kraska claims that UNCLOS has already 
proven itself as a strong instrument that provides public order to the maritime realm (Kraska, 
2007). Groves also argues that the convention brought consistency to states’ actions with 
respect to navigation provisions (Groves, 2012). There are various approaches to the 
international water regime in the literature. Nevertheless, the literature predominantly 
tackles the regime’s weak control mechanisms, and the issue of non-compliance. Even though 
the sea regime possesses unique peculiarities and challenges, it mainly poses familiar 
problems in its provisions with respect to issues of sustainability, compliance, accountability, 
and liability for international cooperation and governance.  
Despite these shortcomings, institutionally and historically, the sea regime indicates a 
prominent and strong posture in relation to other commons regimes, and it may constitute 
an example for governance of other global commons, particularly the outer space commons. 
As Zhao argues (Zhao, 2004), the problems that the international community aimed to resolve 
over the open seas have the potential to function as a source for relevant arrangements and 
agreements for outer space governance. Jonathan Thomas argues that the UNCLOS regime 
presents the most viable legal model for outer space since many of its provisions regarding 
territorial regions of seas, military and environmental use, and jurisdictional matters are 
applicable to, and convenient for, the space medium (Thomas, 2005). He further claims that 
the UNCLOS provisions on environmental protection and risk evaluation offer models for 
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preserving and sustaining the outer space environment. Yet, as mentioned before, no 
effective solution has thus far been provided by UNCLOS for the environmental problems of 
the oceans.  
2.2. Polar Regimes  
2.2.1. Arctic Region  
Even though there is currently no universally recognised definition for the spatial extent of 
the marine Arctic, the international community considers the marine areas north of the Arctic 
Circle as the marine Arctic areas (Weidemann, 2014). According to the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), the international marine boundary in the Arctic is between 
60˚N and the Arctic Circle (AMAP, 1997). AMAP also establishes a circumpolar region as a 
focus for its evaluation activities, which includes both the high and sub-Arctic regions. The 
Arctic region is surrounded by the territories of eight countries, namely, Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the U.S. However, this section will only focus 
on the areas not falling under national jurisdiction.  
The Arctic marine environment is subject to several governance systems (Koivuro & 
Molenaar, 2010). Fundamentally, UNCLOS and the provisions of its CLCS apply to the entire 
Arctic area and have been ratified by all Arctic states except the US. UNCLOS defines and 
determines the boundaries of states’ jurisdiction in the Arctic waters and establishes the 
limits of territorial and EEZ boundaries (Berkman & Young, 2009). However, as of September 
2017 only the Russian Federation and Norway have made submissions to the CLCS with 
respect to their continental shelves that rest within the Arctic Marine field (Koivuro & 
Molenaar, 2010). In addition to the convention, as parts of the international sea law regime, 
the Deep-Sea Mining Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement also apply to the marine 
environment of the Arctic.  
A number of international regulatory organisations emerge in the Arctic marines, such as the 
IMO which sets out a guideline concerning the Arctic climate2 for ships operating in the 
territory. The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission has adopted measures to preserve the 
marine ecosystem in the Arctic Basin. The Convention for the Protection of the Maritime 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic of 1992, which concentrates on environmental 
                                                     
2 Guidelines of Ships Operating in Ice-Covered Arctic Water 2002 
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preservation and pollution, is also applicable to a significant portion of the Arctic Ocean 
(Berkman & Young, 2009). Moreover, most of the international instruments, whether they 
are legally binding or non-binding, related to main sectoral focuses such as fisheries, shipping, 
and scientific research are also applicable to marine territories in the Arctic. The most 
significant of these are the Fish Stocks Agreement, FAO Compliance Agreement, and IMO’s 
mandates which are primarily focused on maritime safety and security (Koivuro & Molenaar, 
2010).  
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR Convention) includes a number of fundamental rules and instructions for 
international cooperation with respect to environmental protection in the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR, 2015). It is the current legislative instrument, which is a combination of the Oslo 
Convention of 1972 and the Paris Convention of 1974, and is enforced by 15 governments 
and the European Union (EU) (Koivuro & Molenaar, 2010). The significance of the OSPAR 
Convention is that it can adopt measures and plans in the form of legally binding decisions, 
agreements, and non-binding recommendations (OSPAR, 1992). As stated in its preamble, the 
ultimate goal of the OSPAR Convention is “to prevent and eliminate marine pollution and to 
achieve sustainable management in the region” (OSPAR, 1992). In line with this objective, the 
OSPAR Commission is supported by five main committees with different sectoral focuses, 
such as Offshore Industry, Biodiversity, and Radioactive Substances (OSPAR, 2015). Finally, 
the OSPAR Commission assists other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations 
in adopting strategic and effective measures to achieve cooperation with a strong emphasis 
on ecological sustainability and security (Koivuro & Molenaar, 2010).  
As a leading intergovernmental body fostering cooperation, organisation, and interaction 
between the Arctic states, the Arctic Council plays a significant role in the region 
(ArcticCouncil, 2017). All the Arctic states are members of the Council. Observer status in the 
Council is available to non-Arctic states, along with other international and regional non-
governmental and intergovernmental organisations. In addition, a unique characteristic of 
the Council is the function it gives to indigenous peoples living within the region (Koivuro & 
Molenaar, 2010). Six different indigenous communities3 within the region have permanent 
                                                     
3 Namely, Aleut, Athabaskan, Gwichin’in, Inuit, Saami and the Russian indigenous peoples  
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participant status in the Council and it is a requirement that they be consulted with prior to 
any decision-making (Koivuro & Molenaar, 2010) (ArcticCouncil, 2017).  
The Arctic Council is a non-governmental forum that was established as a non-legally binding 
declaration, and consequently does not have the authority to impose legally binding 
measures on any of its members or observers (ArcticCouncil, 2017). Although the Council 
does not have such a regulatory authority, it has accomplished considerable success in 
producing policy assessments and recommendations by means of its Working Groups 
(Berkman & Young, 2009). Besides bringing Arctic matters to the attention of international 
forums, the Council has also served as a setting for the development of a number of legally 
binding agreements between Arctic sates, such as the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013 and the Agreement on 
Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation of 2017 (ArcticCouncil, 2017). 
Challenges in Arctic Governance  
First of all, the current regime of the law of the sea and its sub-agreements is an extensive 
international legal framework that applies to all marine territories in the world. In many cases, 
the provisions of the convention are mainly enforced by member countries or through other 
international organisations. This, in turn, often results in inadequacies in implementing 
regional measures that allow for taking proper account of the various Arctic characteristics. 
These failures have been implicitly acknowledged by the Arctic member countries in the 
IIulissat Declaration (2008). This is because of the Arctic region’s unique ecological, 
environmental and political significance, which requires specific fisheries management, 
shipping management, marine environmental protection, and so on.  
Moreover, alongside UNCLOS, the Deep-Sea Mining Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement 
are the cornerstones of the existing marine law regime (Weidemann, 2014). However, there 
are fundamental organisational and regulatory gaps within their structure. The regime does 
not have an efficient regulatory body to control several existing maritime activities, such as 
seabed construction, artificial islands, and military activities in the Arctic (Koivuro & 
Molenaar, 2010). It also falls short in providing default regulatory mechanisms for emerging 
activities, such as tourism, development of oil and gas technologies, and floating structures 
in the Arctic waters. With respect to its governance gaps, it lacks regional organisations 
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responsible for regulating these maritime activities. Also, due to its very board framework for 
marine management, the regime has a very limited capacity to offer protection for Arctic 
wildlife and for preserving ecological balance (Rothwell, 2013). One of the most noticeable 
weaknesses of the regime as an Arctic legal framework is that it merely applies to the marine 
areas of the Arctic. It lacks terrestrial emphasis for the unique seasonal changes in the region. 
Therefore, it is not capable of offering an effective legal framework for the Arctic as a whole 
(Rothwell, 2013).  
Secondly, even though it contributes a great deal to ensuring political stability and 
environmental security in the region, the Arctic Council and its constitutive instruments are 
not entitled to enforce legally binding obligations (ArcticCouncil, 2017). The impact of the 
offered guidelines and recommendations is difficult to evaluate due to the fact that the 
Council is not an operational body and does not have instruments to systematically monitor 
and evaluate member states’ compliance. The Council does not have a permanent 
independent secretariat nor structural funding (ArcticCouncil, 2017). Thirdly, the Council 
offers limited participation to non-Arctic states, and various other non-governmental actors. 
Thus, there is a need for regulatory arrangements that include various stakeholders to deal 
with the challenges arising from the expansion of different sectoral activities in the Arctic.  
Finally, in addition to issues of regulation and governance, the environmental tension is 
increasing in the region due to climate change. Consequently, environmental changes in the 
Arctic alter the geostrategic dynamics of the region, which could have dramatic consequences 
for international security and stability, as well as posing inconveniences for policy efforts to 
strengthen the existing legal regime. Growing attention from the non-Arctic states and non-
state organisations brings further complications to the Arctic governance (Berkman & Young, 
2009). 
Environmental security becomes the determining factor in the Arctic region, as the 
environmental degradation and resource rivalry may generate violent conflicts (Stokke, 
2011). For some, rapid changes in the Arctic offer a unique chance for states to enhance 
international cooperation and to strengthen existing legal frameworks (Stokke, 2011). 
However, a substantial platform is yet to be established to maintain stability and security in 
the Arctic, while this uncertainty becomes a matter of global security. 
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2.2.2. Antarctic Region 
Antarctica on the other hand, is also a global commons and according to the Antarctic Treaty, 
“the area south of 60˚ South Latitude, including all ice shelves”, is considered to fall within 
the boundaries of the Antarctic territory (TheAntarcticTreaty, 1959). The governance of the 
Antarctic area centres on the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) together with other mechanisms 
of international law and international marine law. The introductory instrument of the System 
is the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which entered into force in 1961, and was signed by 12 states, 
seven of them with territorial claims4. As of 2017, 41 other countries have signed to the 
agreement, 17 of which have been actively engaging in various activities in Antarctica (ATS, 
2017). In addition to the Treaty, a number of associated measures have been introduced. 
These measures include the Protocol on Environmental Protection of 1991, the Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals of 1972, and the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Weber, 2012). The main executive body of the System is 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), where the consultative members take 
actions based on consensus decisions. Thus, the ATCM is the primary platform bringing 
stakeholders together, for both formal and informal matters, to take binding measures or 
voluntarily implement resolutions (Weber, 2012).  
The main emphasis of the System to date has been on environmental conservation and 
scientific research. Indeed, due to the absence of a permanent Antarctic population, the 
discussion on the issues of Antarctica has been predominantly about scientific and 
environmental matters (Claytlon & Wilson, 2008). The treaty, in its respective articles, focuses 
on a peaceful environment, free from any aggressive military presence, to establish freedom 
of scientific research and information exchange in order to avoid potential disputes between 
parties and to sustain scientific cooperation between states (TheAntarcticTreaty, 1959). For 
many scholars and international law experts, the signing of the Antarctic Treaty was a 
remarkable accomplishment, despite the existing Cold War crisis and many other unresolved 
territorial disputes on the Antarctic continent (Scott, 2003). By designating Antarctica as “a 
natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”, this commitment was strengthened by the 
1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (Roura & Hemmings, 2011).  
                                                     
4 Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom  
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In addition to the ATS, there are a number of international agreements that have an impact 
on Antarctic governance, such as the International Whaling Commission and the IMO. The 
IMO is an important body for Antarctica because the ATS is not capable of regulating all ships 
operating in Antarctic waters and the Southern Ocean. In addition to its regulatory role in the 
region, the IMO is also active in accident prevention and environmental protection. In this 
regard, the IMO is currently developing the International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar 
Water to assist vessels operating in Antarctica and to prevent environmental harm (ASOC, 
2016). Finally, most of the other international organisations and agreements, such as FAO, 
mentioned in the Arctic section, are either completely or partly applicable to the Antarctic 
region.  
Challenges in Antarctic Governance  
Even though there are climatic and environmental similarities between the polar regions, the 
Antarctic region is considerably more stable and faces fewer problems compared to the Arctic 
region. However, as within the Arctic regime, it is possible to classify the challenges that face 
the Antarctic region into regulatory and governance categories. In terms of the regulatory 
gaps, there are two main industries subject to extensive discussion, bioprospecting and 
Antarctic tourism. These are the two main fields in which the region witnessed considerable 
growth since the end of the Cold War (Hemmings, 2017). The consequences of neither 
tourism nor bioprospecting have been subject to substantial environmental assessment. An 
increasing number of incidents in the Antarctic have raised concerns about environmental 
and human security. Although several measures5 with respect to tourism were adopted by 
the ATCM, none of them have been enforced (Hemmings, 2017).  
Throughout the history of Antarctic governance, especially prior to the 1991 Environmental 
Protection Convention, serious challenges, such as territorial claims and resource exploitation 
demands, had been successfully resolved by democratisation of the regime (Bray, 2016). The 
democratisation included increased participation, complete transparency and accountability 
amongst the member states, international organisations, and non-governmental bodies 
(Bray, 2016). Yet, in the past two decades, a number of issues have developed that endanger 
the legitimacy of the ATS, as well as the environmental security of the region. This inadequacy 
                                                     
5 Measure 4, sets out requirements of the touristic areas (2004) 
  Measure 15, impact assessment of landing of persons from passenger vessels in the Antarctic Treaty (2009) 
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indicates the governance gaps within the ATS. Indeed, it has become very time consuming 
and problematic to establish consensus between member states as the number of the 
participants and interests have grown with the industrial boost after the end of Cold War. In 
other words, developing regulatory conventions that incorporate emerging commercial and 
scientific activities, such as tourism and bioprospecting, while strengthening the existing 
agreements, have become the main challenge for the ATS.  
Similar to the Arctic region, illegal and unregulated fishing poses grave threats to the 
ecological security of the Antarctic region. As fish stocks in other marine areas have collapsed 
or become endangered, illegal and unreported fishing has increased in scale in the Antarctic 
waters and in the Southern Ocean (Dodds, 2010). In addition, despite the regulatory efforts 
developed by the International Whaling Commission, several countries have caused regional 
disputes over illegal whaling in the Antarctic Treaty jurisdiction, such as the ongoing dispute 
between the Australian government and the Japanese Whaling Commission (Dodds, 2010). 
This problem is also connected with Australia’s recognised continental shelf that overlaps the 
Antarctic Treaty area. Thus, issues occurring within certain parts of the Australian continental 
shelf also fall under the Antarctic legal regime. Consequently, the interaction of two legal 
regimes – the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 – produces 
regulatory and governance gaps in the region.  
2.2.3. The Way Forward for the Polar Regions  
Although the governing systems of the polar regions are structurally different, they face 
similar challenges within their regulatory and governing bodies. However, compared to the 
Arctic, the Antarctic remains a territory that is still relatively pristine, with few industrial and 
human impacts (Convey, et al., 2012). This is partly because of its distance and isolation from 
the industrial world, but also because of the effectiveness and foresight of the ATS. As a result, 
the Antarctic region has become a great example of international cooperation, where nations 
conduct and exchange scientific experiments for the sake of regional and global 
environmental development, sustainability, and security. With globalisation, technological 
developments gained momentum and mobility increased significantly. These developments 
offered a more accessible Antarctica, and consequently increased attention on the Antarctic 
resources for various sectoral activities. In addition, the number of permanent stations in the 
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region has increased significantly with the involvement of new states, such as China (Brady, 
2010).  
As a result of these developments, the Antarctic region has been witnessing an industrial and 
structural evolution over the last two decades. As mentioned in the previous section, this has 
resulted in the proliferation of actors and interests and raised several challenges in the region. 
The Treaty System has not been able to take the necessary measures to address issues like 
tourism, overfishing, and bioprospecting. Even though regional and international 
organisations, such as the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) and 
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), provide 
mechanisms to manage and monitor these activities, the overall environmental impact 
remained alarming (Dodds, 2010).  
Early decisions taken by the ATS, in terms of environmental conservation and cooperation, 
provide proof that emerging issues can be accommodated and addressed (Weber, 2012). 
Accordingly, these challenges can be confronted by securing global public interests and by 
providing a developed and updated understanding of ‘democratisation’ within the Antarctic 
regime. In other words, in addressing emerging concerns, the regime needs to employ the 
necessary tools to ensure environmental security, regional and international cooperation, 
and future industrial development in the Antarctic. Hence, these challenges reflect a chance 
for further cooperation and environmentally secure outcomes for the region, provided that 
participants are willing to collaborate.  
As for the Arctic region, due to climate change, environmental security is the main concern 
for the international community. The region is in the midst of a vast environmental 
transformation which is expected to last for decades (Yough, 2012). Despite this ecological 
imbalance, the Arctic states currently have relatively few unresolved maritime disputes 
(Stokke, 2011). At the same time, owing to industrial congestion, geopolitical tension is higher 
and riskier than ever before. At this juncture, there is a need for a unified legally binding 
convention, along with a jurisdictionally strengthened Arctic Council and constitutive 
instruments to monitor and to enforce environmental and legal measures in various sectoral 
fields, such as fisheries, military, shipping, and resource exploitation, including offshore 
hydrocarbon activities. An updated version of the ATS, with a strong focus on environmental 
security and sustainability and international cooperation, for its polar counterpart, would be 
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an appropriate step to take to ensure the maintenance of political and environmental stability 
in the region. This is only possible if UNCLOS takes parallel measures to adjust its legal regime 
to the environmental transformation and shifting geopolitical balances.   
2.3. Conclusion  
Based on Garett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” notion, this chapter aimed to provide 
an overview of today’s most prominent Global Commons and their own “tragedies” along 
with their governance regimes and challenges. In many cases, these tragedies were found to 
be largely inter-related. In other words, as described by Ostrom, the environmental crisis 
occurring in these common resources is based on a web of “interlinked complications” 
(Ostrom, et al., 1999). This can be seen in fossil fuel consumption over land and its 
consequences for the maritime and polar regions. At the same time, in contrast to Hardin’s 
prediction, today’s version of herdsmen, which can be considered to be the members of 
international community, have sought ways to manage access to these commons and agreed 
upon a set of norms of conduct, including limiting economic and political activities therein.  
Now, more than ever, international peace and security, as well as financial prosperity, rely 
upon safe and legitimate access to the common domains that comprise the global commons, 
namely, the oceans and high seas, polar regions, the atmosphere, cyberspace, and outer 
space. Starting with the oceans and high seas in the earliest days of human civilisation, and 
the 20th century’s addition of the atmosphere, and outer space, these domains have served 
as essential mediums through which international communication, trade, relations, and 
governance flourish. However, as this chapter attempted to illustrate, the international 
community has realised that the environment and resources within the global commons are 
very fragile and finite. Further, access to and use of this environment and these resources is 
congested, contested, and competitive (Kumar, 2015).  
Although significant efforts have been made to address these global issues, the world now 
faces new environmental and political difficulties in governing global commons. Firstly, the 
number of participants in common resource pools has increased significantly over the past 
few decades. As a result, organising international meetings, agreeing on regulations, and 
enforcing these regulations become very time-consuming and difficult. Secondly, along with 
financial globalisation, the world is in a period of “reculturisation” and populism where major 
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political and ideological shifts change the international political and cultural landscape. These 
factors have the potential to decrease the probability of global actors reaching agreements 
based on common interests (Ostrom, et al., 1999). Thirdly, the very inter-related nature of 
the global commons presents the potential of exceptional environmental chain reactions6. 
Thus, it is quite challenging to assemble global regimes to work together and prevent these 
reactions from happening. Fourthly, unlike in previous generations, economic and financial 
development, technological and scientific change, and population growth are now increasing 
at an unprecedented rate. Therefore, past experiences are far less applicable to present 
global concerns, which leads to the final difficulty that there is no longer flexibility to allow 
for mistakes when dealing with these global challenges.  
As Tara Murphy argues (2010), tragedies, along with the difficulties in governing global 
commons, require global solutions that can harness innovation to utilise countermeasures 
and cooperation – between public and private sectors, and amongst state and non-state 
actors – and to ensure these risks are sufficiently addressed. This collaboration must be 
backed by legally binding treaties, institutionalised administration structures, and effective 
enforcement bodies and mechanisms (Stang, 2013). International attempts to renovate, 
modernise and intensify governance regimes are a significant additional step, as are 
international legal frameworks and norms which pressure states to act accordingly (Murphy, 
2010). Finally, the UN must ensure, by working with the nations of the world, that the global 





                                                     
6 For example, the more ice melts, the less sunlight is reflected into space, and the warmer oceans get, thus 
melting ice faster.  
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3. Outer Space Security and Governance  
3.1. Introduction 
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, space has become an imperative environment for the 
political, economic, and diplomatic developments across the globe. States, especially the 
Soviet Union/Russia and the US, have used space as an instrument to demonstrate their 
political, financial, and military powers. Over time, outer space turned into an increasingly 
crucial domain for the international community as many more states became space-
dependent. The security and safety of the space medium, especially during and after the Cold 
War, has proven to be very significant for economic and social prosperity. These 
developments, in return, created a need for a multifaceted global space governance regime 
that includes codes of conducts, confidence building measures, international institutions and 
treaties, and enforcement mechanisms. In other words, what is needed is a concept of global 
space governance which can successfully govern and regulate space-related activities based 
on international laws and regulations utilised for global cooperation and integration.  
The necessity for a global governance regime derives from the specific nature of outer space 
as the space domain lies beyond states’ sovereignty. As indicated in the Outer Space Treaty’s 
Article 2, “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty” (UN, 1967, p. 4). Even though the majority of states 
have not agreed on the exact meaning of the ‘common heritage’ principle, the international 
community approaches outer space as a global commons as well (Ervin, 1984). As with the 
other global commons, space is also in collective supply and use where all states can equally 
benefit from the assets and resources of outer space. However, the freedom to access and 
use the space environment is meant to be limited to peaceful purposes that include civil, 
industrial, and commercial fields (UN, 1967). The Outer Space Treaty regime (OST regime), 
along with the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) provided by the 
United Nations, are the main legal and institutional bodies which regulate the right of access 
and action in space (Freeland, 2015). They also constitute the primary international fora for 
the legal framework for governing and monitoring activities in space. 
However, as Sadeh (2015) stresses, the OST regime remains inadequate in overcoming 
obstacles to governing the outer space commons for several reasons. The regime does not 
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provide comprehensive rules or an effective administration for deciding what forms of space 
activities might harm the space environment and assets, and how profits from space activities 
and explorations should be shared between nations (Sadeh, 2015). Steven Freeland is also of 
the opinion that the ineffectiveness of the current legal and regulatory regime is due to its 
incompatibility with the significant scientific and commercial progress of space activities since 
Sputnik (Freeland, 2015). Other scholars argue that the inadequacy of the legal and normative 
structure is caused by the lack of cooperation and dialogue between the major spacefaring 
countries (Mutschler, 2015) (Grego, 2011) (Stang, 2013).  
This chapter aims to introduce the fundamental characteristics of outer space governance 
and security, as the final part of this study’s global commons focus. Unlike the other global 
commons presented in the previous chapter, this chapter provides a more detailed pragmatic 
background on space governance in order to establish a comprehensive foundation for the 
last phases of this study. The chapter begins with the environmental aspects of outer space, 
including its traditional and legal approaches to the domain’s boundaries and resources. 
Secondly, it reviews the concept of space security and its definition from a number of 
perspectives, such as military security, environmental security, and humanitarian security. In 
addition, the terms of space safety and sustainability are also addressed within this section.  
Thirdly, it reviews the outer space governance regime’s legal and regulatory dimensions, the 
institutional and organisational aspects, as well as the extent and nature of cooperation taking 
place therein. The regulatory dimension includes five core outer space treaties and a number 
of principles and declarations along with numerous codes of conducts, guidelines, and other 
measures. The institutional dimension consists primarily of UN bodies, but there are several 
other inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in governance fields, 
such as space traffic management, space vehicle launches and re-entry measures, or space 
vehicle registration. Moreover, international and regional levels of platforms for dialogue, 
such as Heads of Space Agencies Summits or European Space Agency (ESA) Ministerial 
Council, are also mentioned within this section. Fourthly, this chapter assesses the ideological 
factors that shape states’ national space policies along with the international space 
cooperation landscape. Finally, in light of these aspects, it identifies the existing and emerging 
threats and challenges facing the security of the outer space environment and its governance.  
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3.2. Outer Space Environment  
Outer space, or simply space, is the area that exists between celestial bodies, such as planets, 
moons, and stars. Although space, as a hard vacuum, is primarily empty, it contains 
electromagnetic radiation, cosmic rays, and dust, as well as a low density of elements such as 
plasmas of hydrogen and helium (Finckenor & Groh, 2015). Theodore von Karman, in his book, 
set the boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and outer space at an altitude of 100 km, 
which was later recognised as the “Karman line” (Karman & Edson, 1967). Although 
international legal bodies have been unable to agree on the boundaries of outer space, 
Karman’s definition is conventionally used as the beginning of space. The Outer Space Treaty 
of 1967, in its Article 2, defines outer space as the areas of “space including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies” (UN, 1967). In addition to the OST’s definition, outer space commons 
comprise spatial resources surrounding the Earth, namely, Lower Earth orbit (LEO), Medium 
Earth orbit (MEO), and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO). These are regular and repeating paths 
that objects in space, such as the moon, man-made satellites, comets, or asteroids, follow as 
they orbit planet Earth.  
Today, there are thousands of artificial satellites moving within these specific orbits in order 
to provide various services across the world. Considering the extent of services provided by 
satellites, outer space and its spatial resources have become a crucial part of our modern 
society. Thus, maintaining a secure and peaceful outer space environment is a matter of 
international stability and prosperity.  
3.3. Outer Space Security    
Conventionally, “space security” has been linked with the military security of nations, and this 
is still the main use of the term in the literature (Moltz, 2014) (Sheehan, 2015) (Grego, 2011). 
As Michael Sheehan points out (2015), a central aspect of the space security term is the 
contribution that satellites yield to the military security of countries and the sustaining of 
global stability, as well as the technological and military risks to satellites and their capacity 
to support international security. In the last few decades, however, this traditional approach 
has been widened to include a number of dimensions including environmental and 
humanitarian aspects. This is primarily because of the significant change in the understanding 
and the meaning of the term “security” after the Cold War (Peter, 2006).   
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Throughout the Cold War, “security” was understood in distinctive and narrow ways 
(Sheehan, 2015). It used to refer to threats from other states or internal and external bodies 
against state sovereignty. This approach to the term was seen as problematic as it did not 
address the different concepts of security issues (environmental and humanitarian) of the 
post-Cold War era (Buzan, 2007). As a result of the modification efforts, especially within 
western societies, the security discourse has been rearticulated from the conventional 
concerns. Therefore, while military security was viewed as an essential field, new fields such 
as environmental, societal, economic, and technological security concepts emerged. 
Notwithstanding, as Dalby emphasises, the impact of the Cold War on the concept of security 
is still profound (Dalby, 1992). 
In the light of these developments, just like in other commons, the concept of security in 
space changed over time and according to circumstances. As mentioned earlier, although the 
term space security has been discussed and emphasised extensively in the literature, it has 
not been officially defined. However, space security, fundamentally, involves several aspects, 
including the security of satellites and spacecraft in orbit, the security of accessing and 
utilising space, and also the security of ground complexes that provide communication and 
data transfer, as well as the security of people who are using various services provided by 
satellites (Sheehan, 2015). These dimensions of space security are associated with 
environmental, humanitarian, and military security fields, as well as in relation to each other. 
Likewise, Blount argues that space security encompasses three dimensions (Blount, 2011). 
The first is international peace and security, which includes the use and application of space 
technologies for the purpose of ensuring the compliance with international conventions. The 
second dimension covers the provision of national security and protection of the state from 
internal and external threats. The final dimension of space security includes environmental 
security of the space environment that also covers the issues of space sustainability and 
accessibility (Blount, 2011). These approaches to the term are also reflected in the definitions 
of space security.   
Similar to the OST regime’s approach, the Space Security Index (SSI) defines space security as 
“the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based 
threats” (SSI, 2013, p. 5). According to the authors of SSI, the fundamental consideration of 
the SSI definition comprises the sustainability, safety, and security of outer space as an 
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environment that can be utilised carefully and responsibly by all (SSI, 2013).  A more specific 
definition by the Space Generation Council, which particularly emphasises its political sphere, 
is “secure and sustainable access to and use of outer space in accordance with international 
laws and treaties, free from threat of disruption” (Cornell, 2009, p. 3). Moltz, on the other 
hand, defines space security with a more operational focus as “the ability to place and operate 
space-crafts outside the Earth’s atmosphere without external impediment, impairment or 
destruction” (Moltz, 2011, p. 11).  
More comprehensively, according to the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), there are 
various interpretations of the term “space security” and they are mainly founded on national 
interests, previous space activities, and immediate and varying foreign policies (Robinson, 
2011). Furthermore, ESPI offers two distinct “space security” definitions. The first is the 
protection of the environment of outer space, particularly Earth orbits, as a secure and safe 
region for organising space activities, as well as protecting commercial, military, and civilian 
space assets from artificial and natural threats (Robinson, 2011). As for the second model, 
space security involves the use of space to enhance terrestrial security (e.g. the use of 
navigation and communication systems, and earth observation satellites for border control, 
disaster management, maritime safety, etc.).  
Considering these definitions and concepts, it is clear that the term space security is not 
something that can be summarised in a single notion. Therefore, it is required that a definition 
needs to cover an interconnected three-dimensional concept that embraces two existing 
post-Cold War understandings of environmental and military security, as well as the 
humanitarian security of our modern age. Jean Mayence from ESPI fills this gap with a much 
broader approach that covers these issues simultaneously (Mayence, 2011, p. 35):  
“(1) Outer Space for security: the use of space systems for security and defence 
purposes; (2) Security in outer space: how to protect space assets and systems against 
natural and/or human threats or risks and to ensure a sustainable development of 
space activities; (3) Security from outer space: how to protect human life and earth’s 
environment against natural threats and risks from outer space”. 
On the other hand, Sheehan argues that expanding the concept of security may also cause 
problems for policy makers as the term eventually would have an even less consistent 
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understanding and focus to guide policy (Sheehan, 2015). It is also important to note that the 
model of space security has a significant role in international space cooperation and 
governance. More precisely, the understanding of security is crucial for the UN and 
spacefaring states in managing and addressing the security issues in space.   
3.4. Space Safety and Sustainability  
Space is a geographical territory that can be conceptualised as a model of environmental 
security. Many countries have acknowledged this by highlighting the concept of “space 
sustainability”. In fact, space sustainability, as Peter Martinez defines, is a term that has arisen 
within the last decade to refer to a number of concerns linking outer space as an environment 
for performing space activities securely and without restrictions, as well as ensuring 
continuation of the benefits gained from space activities (Martinez, 2015). The U.S. for 
instance, has considered space sustainability as a vital aspect for its national interests (NSP-
US, 2010). Germany has also orientated its policy toward the principle of space sustainability 
(Willsch, 2015).  
Beginning with the 2010 Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, the United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has been actively considering the issue long-term sustainability 
of outer space in their agenda (UNOOSA, 2017). To this end, The Working Group on the Long-
Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities was established under the Technical 
Subcommittee in order to identify issues of concern for the long-term sustainability of outer 
space commons (UNOOSA, 2017).  
Civil society, on the other hand, is becoming an increasingly active player in the identification 
of concerns with respect to long-term outer space sustainability. Regional and international 
organisations such as the International Academy of Astronautics, Committee on Space 
Research (COSPAR), and the International Institute of Space Law have been taking significant 
steps to raise awareness for more responsible outer space activities (Martinez, 2015). This 
indicates the realisation of the limitations of Earth’s orbital environment, and of how 
important sustainable space is for the national and international development.  
Space safety, on the other hand, refers to avoidance and mitigation measures for space 
missions, and it consists of three stages, namely, launch safety, on-orbit safety, and re-entry 
safety.  (Pelton, et al., 2015). Maintaining safety throughout these stages carries a significant 
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importance for the sustainable development of space activities. In other words, space safety 
is devoted to keeping the space environment sustainable by protecting space infrastructure 
and assets from an ever-growing man-made orbital debris threat as well as the risks deriving 
from technical and environmental aspects. Therefore, along with the space sustainability 
term, space safety is also related to space security. However, space security encompasses 
both of them, in terms of scope and content (Pelton, et al., 2015). 
Some spacefaring nations and inter-governmental organisations, such as the US and the EU, 
have established detailed national regulations for launch and re-entry activities (FAA, 2017) 
(ESA, 2015). However, an international framework applicable world-wide is yet to be 
established. Particularly after the Challenger and the Colombia disasters, national measures 
and standards for spacecraft safety during launch and re-entry have gained significant 
momentum (Pelton, et al., 2015). For example, NASA has established an updated public safety 
policy regarding the Shuttle re-entry to prevent future catastrophes (NASA, 2010).  
Perhaps the biggest concern for the long-term sustainability and safety of the outer space 
medium occurs throughout the on-orbit missions. This is due to the harsh environment of 
outer space which includes extreme temperatures, ultraviolet radiation, and most 
importantly, both natural and man-made space debris. The probability of collision between a 
space vehicle and orbital debris is the primary source of risk for the outer space environment. 
A collision is not only capable of putting human spaceflight into danger but also capable of 
causing further collisions. Therefore, controlling orbital debris risk and remediating the orbital 
environment with active debris removal policies and measures have become the ultimate task 
for the spacefaring states when it comes to providing a safe and sustainable outer space 
environment (Crowter, 2003).  
Consequently, the discussions in the literature indicate that a sustainable and safe outer 
space environment can only be provided by collective action and common understanding in 
policy approaches, which is only possible when these safety risks are tackled with a 
comprehensive international framework. Therefore, the following sections of this chapter will 
examine the existing outer space governance, challenges with outer space governance, and 
the underlying ideologies that determine states’ posture with respect to cooperation in space.  
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3.5. International Space Governance and Cooperation 
Shortly after the launch of Sputnik (1957), the UN founded the “United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (UNCOPUOS) in 1958 to take the leading responsibility 
for the enforcement and development of the essential statutes concerning the exploration 
and exploitation of outer space (Freeland, 2015). Through UNCOPOUS, the UN has established 
five core multi-lateral treaties in order to regulate and control the activities in space within 
the most intense period of space exploration (1967-1979) (UN, 2002). The Outer Space 
Treaty7 (OST-1967), considered the Magna Carta of space (Bourbonniere, 2005), and its 
supporting agreements are the primary sources for global space governance (UN, 1967). It 
establishes provisions that aimed to ensure equal access to space for peaceful purposes. This 
convention was basically intended to provide a safe and peaceful environment to promote 
international cooperation, as the primary concern of the global agenda was “security” during 
the Cold War era (Baldwin, 1995).  
Apart from the UNCOPUOS and OST regime, the existing global space legislation consists of a 
number of other international treaties, such as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and 
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (1992), a number 
of customary international laws, and many other non-binding codes and guidelines (Jakhu, 
2016). Moreover, additional international and inter-governmental bodies were established 
under the auspices of the UN to regulate and govern various activities in different sectoral 
applications. In essence, the international space governance framework is implemented 
through the UN committees and institutions. At this point, it is necessary to elaborate on 
these international bodies and related conventions to illustrate the legislative and 
institutional dimensions of outer space governance.  
3.5.1. The United Nations and Outer Space  
As indicated in the previous sections, initially, outer space was perceived as an environment 
in which to conduct military actions. In this regard, the successful launch of Sputnik-1 in 1957 
was a decisive demonstration of the possibility of utilising the outer space domain for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and reconnaissance satellites. This has increased the 
                                                     
7 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 




international demand for a dedicated set of rules for the space domain which can be 
separated from air law (Froehlich, 2017). Consequently, UNCOPUOS (hereafter COPUOS) and 
its Subcommittees8 were created within the UN to promote and enhance international 
cooperation on the peaceful uses and exploration of space; to resolve legal problems which 
might arise during space exploration and exploitation missions; to provide a supranational 
platform for stakeholders to exchange information related with outer space affairs; and to 
keep a public registry of space missions and launches based on the information provided by 
states, inter-governmental organisations, or private entities (Froehlich, 2017).   
The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is the UN office and the 
secretariat of COPUOS that conducts related policies and responsibilities as part of the higher 
UN Secretariat (UNOOSA, 2018). Similar to the COPUOS, UNOOSA has two sub-sections: The 
Space Applications Section (SAS) which manages and conducts the UN Programme on Space 
Applications, and the Committee, Policy and Legal Affairs Section (CPLA), which delivers 
essential secretariat services to the main Committee as well as its subcommittees (UNOOSA, 
2018). SAS has two important institutions under its supervision. The first is the United Nations 
Platform for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UNSPIDER) which aims to 
provide a globally available space-based information system to support and overcome natural 
disasters (UNSPIDER, 2017). The second is the International Committee on Global Navigation 
Satellite System (ICG), which is a voluntary platform providing cooperation and coordination 
among suppliers of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) “to enhance and facilitate 
compatibility, interoperability and transparency between all the satellite navigation systems 
to promote benefits for the global community” (UNOOSA, 2018).  
During the 1960s, it was understood that public and private use of GEO for communication 
and various other services needed to be regulated by a global system agreed upon by 
stakeholder organisations and nations. This need was provided for by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) when it was tasked by the UN in 1963 to control the GEO belt 
with objectives to prevent physical and electromagnetic complications and interferences 
(SWF, 2013). Since then, the ITU manages outer space traffic by assigning GEO slots to States 
by assessing orbital parameters and types of frequencies required (ITU, 2018). Over time, it 
                                                     
8 Scientific-Technical Subcommittee and Legal Subcommittee under the auspices of the Main Committee  
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also became obvious that the outer space environment was becoming increasingly congested 
and was deteriorating due to irresponsible use of spatial resources (Couriel, 2016). In 
response, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee was established in 1993 to 
provide an international forum for governmental bodies to coordinate and exchange 
information on orbital debris research, and to identify and utilise debris mitigation policies 
and actions (IADC, 2016).  
As for the regulatory dimension, in addition to the Outer Space Treaty, together COPUOS and 
the UN General Assembly have developed four more core international treaties, five sets of 
principles, and a number of related resolutions and guidelines with respect to space affairs 
and activities (UNOOSA, 2017). To begin with the remaining core treaties, after the OST, the 
Rescue Agreement9 was the first agreement considered and negotiated by the Legal 
Subcommittee. After years of negotiations, the Agreement came into force in 1968 to 
elaborate on provisions of Article 5 and Article 8 of the Outer Space Treaty, which requires 
states to rescue and assist astronauts or cosmonauts and return them to their countries in 
case of an accident (UNOOSA, 2017). Secondly, the Liability Convention10 entered into force 
in 1972 and establishes a binding liability to pay compensation by launching states for 
damages caused by their space vehicles both on the surface and the space (UNOOSA, 2017). 
Despite this, it was later realised that its provision for the determination of compensation was 
not clear and this resulted in legal ambiguities, for example in the Cosmos 954 incident, when 
the Russian reconnaissance satellite re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere and crashed on 
Canadian soil with a nuclear reactor on board (Burke, 1984).    
The Registration Convention11 was adopted and entered into force in 1976, and it is built upon 
the commitment expressed in the previous agreements and aims to maintain a public registry 
of the space objects launched into outer space (UNOOSA, 2017). Finally, the Moon 
Agreement12 came into force in 1984 and aimed to reaffirm and emphasise the relevant 
provisions of the OST. It emphasises that the celestial bodies should be used and exploited 
for peaceful purposes and that their environment should be preserved from man-made 
                                                     
9 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space (1968) 
10 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972) 
11 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975) 
12 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1984) 
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disruptions. Moreover, its Article 11 signifies the notion of global commons by expressing the 
Moon as the common heritage of mankind (UNOOSA, 2017). Although officially in force, this 
agreement has been signed and ratified by comparatively few countries and is ignored by 
most of the spacefaring nations (Sadeh, 2015). However, this principle is based on the 
common heritage of mankind notion which can also be seen in other UN-based global 
commons legal regimes such as Law of the Sea and its associated regime of governance in the 
International Seabed Authority as well as the Antarctic Treaty. Consequently, a number of 
principles and resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on related matters, such as 
the use of artificial satellites and remote sensing satellites, and on the use of nuclear power 
sources in outer space (UNOOSA, 2017).  
It can be seen that the United Nations along with COPUOS have set the foundations of outer 
space legislation with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and elaborated on it with additional 
binding and non-binding agreements to address various concerns in outer space, and to 
provide a platform for an effective and comprehensive dialogue through its committees. In 
order to scrutinise the nature of global space governance, which is embedded in these UN 
institutions and treaties, one needs to elaborate on the fundamental legal principles provided 
by the OST. In addition, discussions on these principles will link this section to the concept of 
global commons, hence, they will also serve as a legal and practical basis for the issues 
discussed throughout the study.  
3.5.2. The Outer Space Treaty 
First of all, as indicated in the first and second article of the OST, the exploration of outer 
space should be achieved for the benefit and common interests of all nations without any 
discrimination and interference of any kind, on a basis of freedom and equality (UN, 1967). 
Also, outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to any appropriation, occupation, or 
sovereignty of any state (UN, 1967). These two articles establish the most foundational 
principals of the international law of outer space. In particular, the “equality”, “common 
interest”, and “non-appropriation” terms constitute the first binding piece of legislation for 
space governance (Freeland, 2015).  
Through these principals, the space environment has gained status as a global commons at 
the international law level. Moreover, they provide the opportunity to space-faring states and 
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developing countries to undertake broad-ranging discussions of international cooperation 
and sustainable development in outer space on the basis of Article 1. Even though the non-
appropriation principle is stated in explicit terms in Article 2, it only refers to “national” 
entities. Therefore, its applicability to non-governmental and private entities caused 
controversies in the literature (Lee, 2004). With increasing investments and initiatives from 
the private entities in sectors such space mining and space tourism, it becomes even more 
necessary for the international community to clarify the issue of “non-appropriation”.  
The Treaty’s third and fourth articles emphasise that space activities should be carried out in 
compliance with “international law” and with the purpose of maintaining “international 
peace and security”. Moreover, it also forbids the use of “nuclear weapons” in orbit to avoid 
“militarisation” in space (UN, 1967). In addition to the Treaty’s political importance as a stage 
in the development of global cooperation and effective communication between the U.S. and 
USSR, these provisions have precluded the positioning of nuclear and mass destruction 
weapons in earth orbits and on celestial bodies (Menon & Stover, 1987). In addition to the 
legal framework provided by Article 4 with respect to placing nuclear or mass destruction 
weapons in orbit, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), under the auspices of the UN, deals 
with the space security issues as well as militarisation of space through its annual findings 
(UNODA, 2017).  
The remaining articles of the Treaty primarily focus on the preservation and continuity of 
international peace and cooperation, as well as on the specific issues with respect to liability 
and responsibility, and protection of astronauts, which are also covered by the related 
agreements. The Treaty was an important step for world peace and stability as it was created 
in the very tense and dangerous atmosphere of the Cold War. Hence, by virtue of the 
agreement, the two major space powers, as well as many other states, agreed to seek 
peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, following the approval of the OST, several fundamental 
legal and practical questions emerged with respect to the core principals mentioned above. 
In addition, with the growing diversity of space players and activities, particularly in the 
economic and social fields, the need for the development of new legal regulations to govern 
outer space affairs has intensified.  
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3.6. Challenges in Outer Space Governance  
Outer space governance is fundamental to realising the benefits that we acquire from the 
space environment. The primary objective of space governance is to maintain secure and 
sustainable uses of space for civil, commercial, environmental, and military purposes. 
However, there are a number of challenges to outer space governance that require global 
attention to enhance the realisation of this objective. As indicated in the previous section, 
some of these challenges derive from the regulatory framework provided by the Outer Space 
Treaty Regime as well as states’ failures related to self-restraint and self-regulation in 
accordance with the regime. Other obstacles are related to achieving collective action in 
relation to the commons of outer space and attaining strategic assurance between the 
stakeholders.   
3.6.1. Outer Space Treaty Regime  
The early literature on the Treaty’s provisions was mainly focused on the ambiguous language 
that was used. With respect to Article 1, for instance, Jasentuliyana pointed out the lack of 
legal enforcement mechanisms to provide “co-operation” between states in space. He asked, 
“to what degree are States obliged to cooperate and share information on their activities with 
other States?” (Jasentuliyana, 1989, p. 140). In fact, this question was also applied to the 
“common interests” and “equality” principals of the Treaty as the exploration of outer space 
is to be conducted “for the benefit of all countries”. Moreover, the question of international 
cooperation emerged once more when private entities with commercial motivations became 
involved in the space arena (Hoover, 1983). It is still not clear to what extent private entities 
are required to contribute to international cooperation.  
Similar to Article 1, the scope and effect of Article 2, with respect to the prohibition of State 
sovereignty and non-appropriation principle, are not clearly articulated. As Ricky Lee argues, 
Article 2 does not refer explicitly to private entities or other non-governmental bodies (Lee, 
2004). Although this gap was later filled by the Moon Agreement’s (1979) several Articles, 
none of the major spacefaring countries has ratified it13. On the other hand, Freeland argues 
that both the US and USSR had already been engaging in various space activities, yet neither 
of them had claimed sovereignty over any part of space (Freeland, 2015). Ironically, following 
                                                     
13 There are only 17 states that ratified the Moon Agreement as of November 2016.  
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the treaty, the legal debate on the “non-appropriation” term has increased due to the 
ambiguous language of the Treaty.  
The Treaty’s following articles, concerning the principles of “in accordance with international 
law” and “peaceful purposes”, have also been subject to comprehensive criticisms within the 
literature (SSI, 2014). Nancy Gallagher (2010) argues that this is due to the OST’s lack of 
conceptual clarity and insufficient control mechanisms that failed to provide detailed statutes 
or an authoritative course for deciding what forms of space activities are incompatible with 
the given “international law” and “peaceful purposes” principles. Moreover, it is also unclear 
what types of individual or collective actions are appropriate to or might damage the common 
benefits and interests (Gallagher, 2010).   
As reflected in the literature, the regime falls short in providing an efficient and regulatory 
language. Consequently, it also fails to provide authoritative governance to overcome the 
legal, political, and environmental crises occurring in space. In such environments, existing 
regimes, in the past and present, could not prevent some states from causing large scale 
problems. However, this is not only due to inadequate governance. The environment can also 
be contaminated by irresponsible space behaviour, and lack of collective action between 
states. For example, China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 to destroy 
its own satellite, which produced thousands of additional pieces of debris that still endanger 
the space environment and space assets (Gill & Kleiber, 2007).  
3.6.2. Challenges of Collection Action and Strategic Assurance in Outer Space 
In order to prevent such tragedies occurring in outer space, collective action is indispensable. 
Yet, the commons of outer space represent a collective action challenge for policy makers and 
stakeholders in formulating and implementing a space governance regime to restrict and 
regulate free access and free use of space resources (Sadeh, 2015). The primary obstacle to 
achieving a collective action regime in outer space, as discussed previously, is the OST regime. 
In spite of promising efforts to maintain collective action within the framework of the treaty 
regime, as well as enthusiasm in the forms self-regulation and self-restraint by some states, 
the increasing presence of orbital debris and congestion in space seem to cause further 
problems for international community in establishing collective action.  
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Secondly, perhaps the most emerging and threatening challenge for collective action is the 
issue of orbital debris. As of 2017 January, according to the European Space Agency, the 
number of debris objects regularly tracked by the Space Surveillance Network is about 23,000, 
and the total number of debris bigger than 10 cm is estimated to be more than 29.000 (ESA, 
2017). When these existing figures are combined with irresponsible space behaviour, such as 
the Chinese ASAT test, and orbital conjunctions, such as the February 2009 collision between 
a US Iridium and a dysfunctional Russian Cosmos satellite, the space debris problem is highly 
likely to result in an environmental catastrophe (Bradley & Wein, 2009). Even though there 
are collective action developments with respect to orbital debris mitigation performed by the 
IADC, regional and national efforts, and the UN resolutions and guidelines, with the 
continuing irresponsible behaviour and lack of binding legal arrangements the goal of long-
term sustainability of outer space seems unlikely to be reached (Sadeh, 2015).  
The third and final obstacle facing global collective action in outer space is the case of Earth 
observation. Historically, Earth observation has been one of the most successful fields in 
international outer space cooperation and harmonisation. The vital aspect in this case of 
global cooperation is the possibility of scientists and policy makers across the world to work 
together in examining and analysing global data and to use it for policy-related purposes 
(Sadeh, 2015). Particularly, the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) played an 
important role in coordinating and harmonising earth observations globally (CEOS, 2017). Yet, 
these observations with remote sensing satellites are capable of observing a wide range of 
properties of a country’s land use, agricultural data, air quality, and so on. Such a violation of 
the sovereignty of nations may lead to lack of co-operation and co-ordination between states, 
especially when these assessments are made of natural resources with large economic value 
(Macauley, 2010).  
Moreover, as Sadeh points out (2015), sovereignty issues are also emerging in the cases of 
commercial and military remote sensing systems. With the development of high-resolution 
imagery technology, intelligence information gained via such tools can put the idea of 
collective action into jeopardy (Macauley, 2010). Unequal access to such satellite imagery and 
processing systems can cause substantial differences between developing states and 
developed ones and create destabilising impacts on the international community (Sadeh, 
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2015). Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the data obtained from these tools will only be 
used to enhance international security and stability.  
As for the strategic assurance model, the obstacle to outer space governance is linked with 
the international community’s collective action on the basis of international strategic goals 
(Rendleman, 2013). These strategic goals evolve in ensuring outer space cooperation and 
involve aspects of space situational awareness, global engagement, lawful means of outer 
space protection, and deterrence to protect space assets (Sadeh, 2015) (Rendleman, 2013). 
To begin with lawful means of space protection, the existing outer space law regime oblige 
potential conflicts, space warfare, and various other risks to the space environment and 
assets (Sadeh, 2011). Nevertheless, such legal instruments either have limited validity, such 
as the Moon Agreement, or weak enforceability like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Sadeh, 
2011). As discussed earlier, these regulative deficits derive from the OST regime and its weak 
institutional mechanisms to enhance legal control over space activities, as well as the 
disinclination of spacefaring states to comply with these regulative frameworks.  
The notion of deterrence to protect the outer space environment and assets is inter-
connected with global engagement and space situational awareness and it refers to the 
objective to overcome the challenge of protection of space assets from risks as a common 
strategic purpose (Harrison, et al., 2009). Deterrence, in this respect, represents a shared 
global interest in the space commons. For instance, damage to the telecommunication system 
would have devastating consequences for global financial stability and welfare. Such that, 
even a single missile test on any public or private space infrastructure would jeopardise the 
orbital environment. Achieving and promoting space situational awareness and global 
engagement in space affairs represents major enhancements in international peace and 
stability as well as regional and national economic developments. However, such a global 
engagement with mutual respect between stakeholders, like the Paris accord for climate 
change, is yet to be established in outer space. The environmental situation in the orbital 
medium, on the other hand, continues to deteriorate.   
As a result, as discussed earlier, the characteristics of “the tragedy of the commons” are 
evoked in space as the contamination of the space medium, where unwise and self-interested 
states (like the Herdsmen in Hardin’s concept) try to enlarge their own profits from a limited 
open source without considering the negative effects of their actions on other states, and on 
43 
 
finite resources. Thus, in addition to the central authority that establishes rules and responds 
to violations, the importance of collaboration and communication between states and non-
state actors becomes very clear in ensuring security and sustainability in global commons.  
3.7. International Initiatives & Concluding Remarks  
Over the last two decades, there have been a number of initiatives established to cope with 
the challenges with regards to outer space sustainability and governance. These efforts differ 
from past initiatives in that they are rather “bottom-up” projects pursued to create voluntary 
principles or norms of conduct, and in some cases, include contributions from non-state 
actors (SWF, 2017). Some of these initiatives are discussed in below.  
In 2010, a Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities was presented by 
the European Union. It aimed to constitute norms of responsible behaviour in space that 
would decrease the threat of orbital debris and increase transparency in space activities, in 
order to prevent collisions between space vehicles and debris (EU, 2014) (Johnson, 2014). 
After its first meeting, the draft Code of Conduct received varied responses from the 
international community.  Some developing space powers, such as China, Brazil, and India, 
stated that the process for developing the draft code was not transparent and expressed 
disappointment over not being adequately consulted (Farnsworth, 2014). Russia and the US 
argued that the draft code is not sufficiently equipped to prevent an arms race in space 
(Farnsworth, 2014). Even though no non-EU states signed the EU Draft, an agreement was 
reached between spacefaring states to use it as a foundation for further negotiations of an 
international Code of Conduct (Johnson, 2014). Moreover, it is widely argued that the Draft 
Code represents the EU’s current evolution into a more prominent international actor in 
space affairs (Rathgeber, et al., 2009). 
In 2011, COPUOS founded the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Space 
Activities (LTSSA), to discuss subjects of concern for the long-term sustainability of outer 
space operations (UNOOSA, 2017). The Working Group was later divided into four Expert 
Groups to focus on particular subjects and create draft guidelines on the topics of sustainable 
space utilisation, space debris, space weather, and regulatory regimes and guidance for new 
actors in the space arena (Johnson, 2014). The discussions are still continuing on the 
compendium, which is expected to be referred to the UN General Assembly in 2018 (UNOOSA, 
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2017). In raising awareness towards the limited space sources and ensuring secure and 
sustainable access to space, the group has a potential to build a common approach between 
various stakeholders from national governments to commercial operators.  
Finally, in 2010, Russia recommended to the UN Secretary General the establishment of a 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to identify potential transparency and confidence 
building measures for outer space (Johnson, 2014). The UN General Assembly approved the 
proposal and fifteen states offered participant specialists to take part in the GGE meetings. 
The primary goal of GGE was to create a consensus framework that emphasises findings and 
recommendations on transparency and confidence-building measures that can promote 
stability and sustainability in the outer space medium (Koller, 2012).  
The Group presented its final report, based on consensus, to the UN Secretary General in 
2013 and concluded that the “world’s growing dependence on space-based systems and 
technologies and the information they provide requires collaborative efforts to address 
threats to the sustainability and security of outer space activities” (GGE, 2013). At this point, 
the group emphasises that transparency and confidence building measures can help in 
building consensus-based cooperation between states as well as contributing to reduce 
militarisation in the space domain. Moreover, the resolution is considered a new “step-by-
step” approach to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that may promote and 
encourage potential initiatives in the future (Tronchetti, 2016). However, due to its lack of 
mechanisms to verify compliance through its provisions, the resolution has received criticisms 
from the US and the EU. Their failure to support the Resolution reduces its ability to succeed 
in its objectives (Tronchetti, 2016).   
It can be seen from these initiatives that the international community’s highly militarised 
focus towards the outer space commons has shifted to a more environmental one during the 
past two decades. With the involvement of commercial actors, this has shown itself through 
increasing emphasis on the sustainability of outer space activities. Today, more than ever, the 
international community is showing a strong commitment to reducing environmental risks 
towards orbital resources posed by irresponsible use. Even though there are a number of 
promising responses, such as reviewed policy initiatives, effective mechanisms to implement 
these responses are yet to be established. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate the 
deficiencies within the existing prevention measures taken by the international community 
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along with the regulatory regimes concerning outer space security and governance, and to 
analyse similar practices employed in other global commons. In conclusion, this chapter 
aimed to illustrate the nature of space security governance, as well as the inadequacies within 
this governance regime that failed to prevent the environmental tragedy from happening. 
The next chapter will focus on, and elaborate, this environmental tragedy occurring in the 
space domain, namely space debris. Following this, policy recommendations will be made for 
addressing this problem and shortfalls in outer space governance, centring on Ostrom’s 


















4. Tragedy of Outer Space: Orbital Debris 
Despite the numerous efforts which have been undertaken, the international community is 
yet to provide adequate authority in outer space. As a result of the deficiencies within 
international space jurisdiction and the disinclination of space powers, various political and 
diplomatic crises took place in space between states throughout the history of the space age. 
Concurrently, the exploration and exploitation of space have proliferated significantly. Hence, 
the activities in outer space have produced a vast amount of space debris. Consequently, in 
addition to the existing political and diplomatic crises, environmental threats are also raised. 
Amongst these environmental problems such as orbital crowding and radio frequency 
interference, space debris is the main emerging threat with the space arena. The space debris 
problem is an escalating concern for all spacefaring countries as the growing number of 
particles orbiting the Earth represents an accident risk to all space vehicles, particularly to the 
International Space Station (ISS) and other spacecrafts with human occupants. This means a 
relatively small piece of debris can endanger operational satellites used for private, military, 
industrial, and commercial purposes as well as human life in space. Therefore, the mitigation 
of space debris is of a great importance for the provision of environmental, economic, civilian, 
and military security of all nations. This chapter aims to evaluate the extent of the space 
debris problem as well as how it is addressed within the international legal framework. It then 
examines the existing policy initiatives which attempt to mitigate or reduce the growing 
orbital debris problem.  
4.1. The Nature of Space Debris  
Also known as space junk, according to the UNCOPUOS technical report in 1999 “space debris 
are all man-made objects including their fragments and parts, whether their owners can be 
identified or not, in Earth orbit or re-entering the dense layers of the atmosphere that are 
non-functional with no reasonable expectation of their being able to assume or resume their 
intended functions or any other functions for which they are or can be authorised” (Crowter, 
2003). In other words, space debris is any man-made artefact discarded or accidentally 
produced from rocket stages and boosters, fragments of older or new satellites, or 
dysfunctional satellites as well as gears such as cameras and grease guns that were dropped 
during space walks around the ISS (Imburgia, 2011). Naturally forming debris such as 
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meteoroids and asteroids are part of the outer space environment and will not be subject to 
discussion as part of this chapter’s focus.  
According to ESA’s Space Debris Office, as of January 2017, 4,300 space vehicles have been 
launched to Earth orbit. Only 1,200 of these vehicles are still functioning, which means the 
remaining 3,100 vehicles now serve as massive orbital debris as they have significant potential 
for break-ups, explosions, and collisions in the space environment (ESA, 2017). Some 23,000 
pieces of debris are regularly tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network in order to 
prevent further collisions (ESA, 2017). There is an estimated mass of 7,500 tonnes of man-
made space objects in Earth orbit and most of this mass is now considered as orbital debris, 
which is forming a massive cloud around planet Earth and which poses a number of threats 
to the long-term sustainability of space.  
4.2. Threats Posed by Space Debris 
The primary threat of orbital debris is the risk of damage resulting from collision with 
spacecrafts, satellites, and other space vehicles operating in space. What makes these 
fragments extremely hazardous is their extraordinarily high speed, which can reach up to 
17,500 mph, fast enough for a relatively small particle to deactivate functioning spacecrafts 
(Bird, 2003). Due to their orbital velocity, any collision with a space debris fragment can cause 
significant damage to even well protected space vehicles. For instance, in 1983, a paint chip 
of approximately 0.2 mm, collided with the Challenger space shuttle and required a window 
replacement at a cost of $50,000 (Mirmina, 2005). In 1996, a French reconnaissance satellite 
was struck by a rocket fragment and as a result of the impact lost its stabilisation bar (Bird, 
2003). In 1997, a Japanese earth observation satellite, and in 1998, a US intercontinental 
ballistic missile, were destroyed after colliding with space debris (Bird, 2003).  
Unfortunately, in a number of cases, the impact of collisions was far more catastrophic for 
the space environment. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the collision between the 
functioning Iridium satellite and a dysfunctional Russian communication satellite in 2009 in 
low earth orbit created over 1,000 new pieces of space debris larger than 10 cm (Chen, 2011). 
Similarly, a Chinese ASAT test in 2007 created more than 2,600 new pieces of debris larger 
than 10 cm. It is widely believed that together these collisions have altered the landscape of 
the orbital debris environment in the low earth orbit and are considered the “worst satellite 
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breakups in history” (David, 2013). Moreover, the test raised concerns over a possible arms 
race in space (David, 2013).   
The cascade impact, which was initially proposed by Donald J. Kessler as the “Kessler 
Syndrome”, is perhaps the most severe consequence of the escalating issue of orbital debris 
(Baker, 1989). According to a study conducted by NASA’s Orbital Debris Program in 2006, the 
orbital environment has reached a level where collisions between existing debris will lead the 
space debris population to increase for the next two hundred years (Liou, 2011). Thus, the 
collisions between existing fragments will cause further collisions with other man-made space 
objects and will eventually introduce a constantly increasing space debris presence in the 
orbital environment (Kessler & Burton, 1978). Consequently, as many scholars have pointed 
out, such a cascading effect may result in an increasingly unmanageable space debris problem 
which is virtually impossible to prevent and is capable of leaving low earth orbits unusable for 
future space activities (Baker, 1989) (Chen, 2011) (Crowter, 2003).  
Space debris is also capable of interfering with commercial, military, and scientific satellites 
and can cause misinterpretations in calculations of the data received from these satellites. 
Similarly, some space debris can be utilised for military purposes as effective 
countermeasures against other spacefaring countries and their satellites (Baker, 1989). 
However, threats from space debris are not limited to the orbital environment. Although most 
of the dysfunctional payloads burn up in the atmosphere at the end of their orbital lifetime, 
some of the large objects may survive atmospheric re-entry and fall down to Earth and may 
cause casualties as well as environmental problems, such as the Soviet Satellite Cosmos 954 
which crashed in Canada and leaked radioactive substances over a large territory (Bird, 2003).   
In short, space debris threatens human security in space and on the ground. Secondly, it can 
severely damage earth observation and remote sensing satellites which are being used for 
crucial purposes, such as crisis management, urban planning, agriculture, water management, 
and so on. Thirdly, it may critically affect or even collapse some essential services that 
satellites provide to modern societies on a daily basis, such as internet, banking, 
communication, navigation, and GPS. Finally, it may create a long-term orbital belt around 
the Earth and prevent space exploration activities for a very long time. In short, humanity has 
become so dependent on space applications that a threat towards the outer space commons 
and satellites therein, and their services, would have disastrous consequences. It is therefore 
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necessary to investigate the governing regimes and their measures with regards to the orbital 
debris problem.  
4.3. Existing Legal Framework Regarding Orbital Debris  
There are a number of established agreements that, to some extent, address the issue of 
space debris. However, as the previous chapter already outlined the international space 
governance and law, this section is dedicated to investigating the principles related to 
environmental security in outer space. To begin with the OST, although it signifies the view of 
outer space as a global commons its language delivers a minimal legal framework for the 
space debris problem or more broadly, the environmental protection of outer space. But 
some of the provisions within the Treaty, such as Article 914, indirectly emphasise the 
significance of environmental protection and sustainability of space as it provides a more 
comprehensive limitation on activities that might harm the space environment. Yet, this 
limitation only applies to “scientific studies of outer space”, not the use of outer space 
resources (UN, 1967). Moreover, the treaty fails to assess proper counter measures in case of 
an accident caused by these scientific studies and investigations. Finally, due to the 
inadequacies within the language of the treaty, there is no consensus over the term “harmful 
contamination”, therefore, it raises questions as to whether it encompasses space debris or 
not (Imburgia, 2011) (Roberts, 1992). 
The Moon Treaty has also developed provisions on the environmental protection of outer 
space. In its Article 715, the treaty articulates that states should prevent activities in outer 
space that might disrupt the existing balance of the space environment (UN, 1979). Unlike 
Article 9 of the OST, Article 7 of the Moon Treaty explicitly emphasises the subject of 
environmental sustainability and protection. Nonetheless, it suffers many of the same 
inadequacies that Article 9 of the OST as its ambiguity on the terminology fails to define the 
terms of “harmful contamination” and “adverse changes” (Roberts, 1992). In addition, most 
nations have not ratified the Moon Treaty, which weakens its enforceability in keeping states 
                                                     
14 “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination” Article 9 – Outer Space Treaty 
1967 
15 “States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, 
whether by introducing adverse changes in that, environment, by its harmful contamination through the 
introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise.” Article 7 - The Moon Treaty 1979 
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accountable for their actions that cause environmental degradation (Bird, 2003). It is widely 
accepted that the OST and the Moon Treaty have not contributed extensively to preserving 
the outer space environment from the proliferation of orbital debris (Alby, 2015) (Mirmina, 
2005).  
The Liability Convention along with the Registration Convention, on the other hand, represent 
the most applicable and effective regulatory frameworks for protecting the space 
environment. With its liability provisions, such as Article 316, the Liability Convention is the 
primary legal instrument for assessing compensation and sanction for damages caused by 
space objects (Roberts, 1992) (UN, 1972). The liability provisions are only applicable for 
persons or property in outer space, but not for damage caused to the environment itself 
(Imburgia, 2011). Therefore, similar to the other treaties, the Liability Convention falls short 
when it comes to minimising space debris. Nevertheless, it is an important instrument in 
protecting the space environment from intentional and unintentional incidences which can 
cause increases in the number of existing space debris as well as in establishing an effective, 
binding regime to prevent arms race in space which also can deteriorate the environmental 
tragedy in space.   
The Registration Convention, on the other hand, facilitates compensation by ensuring that 
space objects which are responsible for damage are identified as clearly as possible. Article 1 
of the Convention provides a broad definition for the term space objects, where it includes 
the “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof” (UN, 
1976). Several scholars have argued that the extent of definition encompasses all forms of 
space debris (Roberts, 1992). There are still concerns with regard to the ambiguity of the 
definition, which should be resolved in favour of a more comprehensive definition that 
addresses the term space debris explicitly. Moreover, an additional debris-related drawback 
to the Convention is the lack of clarity as to whether inactive satellites, rocket stages, and 
other space vehicle break-ups should be subject to registration (Imburgia, 2011). Such objects 
make up a significant proportion of the space debris population and even if the Liability 
Convention did assess the space debris issue, enforcing compensation and sanction over 
                                                     
16 “In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth to a space object of one 
launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object of another launching 
State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is 
responsible” Article 3 – The Liability Convention 1972 
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irresponsible behaviour would be impossible due to inadequate recording under the 
Registration Convention.  Even though the Registration Convention provides a data-sharing 
platform to assist in observing and tracking of space objects, it fails to establish an applicable 
instrument to account for space debris (Imburgia, 2011).  
In fact, all of the UN conventions clearly demonstrate that the space debris term and 
phenomenon remain an unsolved concern within its legal framework. Moreover, the Legal 
Subcommittee of the COPUOS is unlikely to reach legally applicable and enforceable 
commitments regarding the orbital debris issue in the near future. This is due to the failure 
of forming of consensus in favour of establishing a binding treaty on orbital debris as some of 
the States demand for further technical research on the issue. (Mirmina, 2005). Moreover, a 
general reluctance to enter into any new binding treaties since the Moon Treaty has also 
reduced the commitments towards a feasible binding treaty. Yet as mentioned previously, 
the environmental situation continues to worsen. Therefore, the international community 
sought ways to establish voluntary measures that can mitigate the space debris population or 
prevent it from increasing. 
4.4. Existing Measures Confronting the Tragedy  
A number of principles and guidelines have been established at both national and 
international level with the purpose of minimising space debris proliferation and protecting 
space assets from its effects. The problem of man-made orbital debris has been an important 
focus of UNCOPUOS’ Technical Subcommittee’s agenda since 1994. In 1999, UNCOPUOS 
published a comprehensive technical report on space debris where it outlined potential space 
debris mitigation measures (UNCOPUOS, 1999). Since the release of this report, there has 
been a common perception that the current space debris problem poses great risks to the 
outer space commons (UNOOSA, 2010). In addition to UNCOPUOS, a number of existing 
organisations play a significant role in this matter, such as the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC), as well as regional and national space agencies and 
commercial actors.  
In 2002, IADC adopted a set of guidelines which call for measures such as constructing 
satellites and rocket stages to reduce the number of mission-related debris released into orbit 
and to reduce the risk of collision with non-operating satellites (IADC, 2007). Based on the 
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measures provided in the IADC Guideline, UNCOPUOS adopted a set of space debris 
mitigation guidelines in 2007 (UNOOSA, 2010). In February 2008, the UN General Assembly 
endorsed and adopted these nonbinding mitigation guidelines, hereby enhancing the 
international efforts to tackle the space debris problem (Imburgia, 2011). Together, these 
guidelines established a foundation for international efforts to control the debris population. 
Moreover, national and regional space agencies, such as NASA and ESA, are involved in 
mitigation policies and have adopted a set of standards and guidelines on debris mitigation 
(NASA, 2012) (ESA, 2015). A number of other national agencies adopted technical guidelines 
and regulations to meet the presented requirements within these guidelines, such as the 
French Space Act (CNES, 2011).  
Although the guidelines are not legally binding, they have proven to be partially successful. 
As Chen indicates, even where existing mitigation measures were not fully implemented, they 
still resulted in a decrease in the total amount of debris released between 1997 and 2006 
(Chen, 2011). However, the benefit of these efforts was reversed after the collisions of 
Cosmos 954 and the Chinese ASAT test, which caused a steep increase in debris population 
(Liou, 2011).  
The international community and national agencies have been working on a number of 
potential supportive approaches to space debris mitigation. The first approach is active debris 
removal (ADR), which refers to the removal of debris from the orbital environment (Chen, 
2011). This approach has gained a significant momentum after the steep increase in the debris 
population and a number of guidelines and scientific proposals have been made to remediate 
the orbital environment (Alby, 2015). The first International Conference on Orbital Debris 
Removal was held in December 2009 and it represents the first joint effort by spacefaring 
countries to explore the issues and challenges deriving from ADR (Chen, 2011).  
A number of initiatives and workshops have been organised by national space agencies, such 
as Clean Space by ESA, to work on scientific and technological matters related to ADR. A 
significant amount of research has been conducted to explore the financial and scientific 
aspects of ADR (Walker & Martin, 2003) (Wiedmann, et al., 2004) (Castronuovo, 2011). 
Various methods and techniques are presented throughout these researches and workshops. 
However, the majority of the proposed solutions are mainly perceived as technically 
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impractical, excessively expensive, or as posing a risk of environmental damage during 
operation (Sorge & Peterson, 2015).  
As ADR methods are yet to be feasible, finding alternative methods to avoid in-orbit collisions 
and to reduce the risks to space objects has gained importance. Space traffic management, 
which refers to “activities intended to prevent orbital damage as well as actions that must be 
taken to reduce the long-term potential for future collisions” (Lala & Schrogl, 2006), is the 
primary method used to maintain safety in orbit. There have been valuable reports published 
under the auspices of ITU, UNCOPUOS, and IADC with regards to space-traffic management 
and even a new institution, the International Space Traffic Management Organisation, was 
proposed as the main entity to govern space traffic operations (Chen, 2011).  
In light of the efforts made by these organisations and technical and scientific initiatives, it is 
possible to argue that a central body is essential for harmonising existing management 
platforms and for effective space traffic management. Currently, there is no unified 
organisation that encompasses the administrative, legal, operational, political, and technical 
backgrounds to successfully implement all these levels of space traffic management system 
(Chen, 2011). Such an organisational body needs to be capable of adjusting to an ever-
growing and evolving space environment, while providing a solid foundation to ensure a 
secure and effective operating environment for space activities.  
4.5. Conclusion 
Over the course of the space age, space activities have produced a vast amount of orbital 
debris that threatens the orbital environment and space assets therein. Managing the debris 
population and preventing its population from increasing represent a crucial task for long-
term sustainability of the space commons. The international community has taken significant 
steps in a positive direction by establishing debris mitigation guidelines and by encouraging 
and supporting scientific and technical initiatives to take part in debris removal activities. 
However, as some regions of space, especially lower earth orbit, have already reached 
critically high debris density, the debris population is likely to increase over the next two 
centuries.  
This is a critical example of an environmental tragedy as conceptualised by Garett Hardin 
where absence of, and deficiencies in, space governing authority led self-interested users to 
54 
 
engage in irresponsible behaviour in the outer space commons. As a result, the orbital debris 
population now poses a persistent threat to the spatial commons that could critically harm 
global social, economic, and political welfare. Preventing this tragedy, or at least weakening 
its impact on international security and stability, is a crucial task that a central governing 
authority should take. In addition, self-regulative norms based on transparency and collective 
action should be established through effective international diplomatic relations. Policy 



















5. Conclusion & Policy Proposals 
As Paul Stern points out, Garett Hardin’s work “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) has 
inspired and challenged a generation of people concerned with the welfare of Earth’s natural 
resources (Stern, 2011, p. 213). Over time, local environmental problems broadened to 
global-scale problems. Several other major works concerning the issue of environmental 
degradation, such as The Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich and The Limits to Growth by Dennis 
Meadows, have argued that the scale of tragedy is no longer limited to small regions but has 
spread to a global dimension (Ehrlich, 1968) (Meadows, et al., 1972). These and many other 
works have indicated that the global commons were about to face unprecedented 
environmental tragedies. During the past four decades, the international community did far 
less than it was capable of to stop these tragedies from taking place. Even though there have 
been a number of successful measures implemented on a global scale illustrate opportunities 
for mitigation, the majority of tragedies are still present and growing.  
This research has attempted to demonstrate that the existing governance measures in the 
global commons have not been able to resolve the emerging environmental tragedies. As a 
case study, the research focused on outer space commons. This chapter initially serves to 
point out the key governance shortcomings within the maritime and polar commons and to 
compare them with the ones occurring in the outer space commons. After identifying 
common governance deficits, the study discusses Ostrom’s design principles (2003) as 
potential strategies for better governance in the global commons. In the light of the 
discussions, it concludes with policy proposals to address the space debris problem. 
5.1. Key Deficits in Global Commons Governance 
First of all, continuing non-compliance with the provisions of the Law of the Sea and the 
Antarctic Treaty pose an emerging problem for global commons governance. Both in the 
oceans and the polar regions, states’ refusal to participate in dispute resolution procedures 
and to comply with the legal order discredits the treaty’s legitimacy and harm ongoing 
negotiations within various multilateral bodies. Russian refusal to attend resolution 
proceedings over conflicts with the Netherlands in the Pechora Sea, or the Chinese 
illegitimate claims over the artificial islands in the South China Sea are the examples of a 
consistent pattern of non-compliance with the international law provisions (Churchill, 2012).  
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Non-compliance is not only a challenge to effective governance but in some cases, it can also 
pose direct threats to ecological balance. Continuing illegal fishing and whaling within the 
Antarctic Treaty jurisdiction are cases where it contributes to the environmental tragedy. 
Similarly, in spite of the relevant provisions of the OST, China’s ASAT test not only violated the 
already fragile validity of outer space law but also resulted in an excessive increase in space 
debris. In this regard, the global commons governance system is inadequate in providing 
effective compliance-monitoring and transparency measures and therefore requires 
substantial legal and institutional reform as well as instruments that can promote self-
restraint and self-regulation.  
Existing governance regimes and legal frameworks are not only undermined by persistent 
non-compliance, but they are also outdated and possess a lack of effective regulatory and 
institutional arrangements when it comes to controlling emerging activities such as Antarctic 
tourism, bioprospecting, seabed construction, developing oil and gas technologies, and 
floating structures. Similar emerging activities in outer space are yet to be officially defined 
and regulated, such as asteroid mining and space tourism. In some cases, such as ocean 
governance, the number of organisations causes proliferation of authorities but for the most 
part these are lacking any effective regulatory and monitoring ability due to overlapping 
mandates.  
Gaps in regulatory regimes are furthermore affected by a lack of clarity in defining and 
addressing critical terms. Linguistic ambiguity can be found in almost every international legal 
framework reviewed in this research and they are often capable of causing controversies for 
authorities in addressing specific problems such as space debris, or contribute to disputes 
between states. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the global commons regimes either lack 
regulatory and organisational instruments, or existing instruments are ineffective in 
enforcement, and in legally framing and monitoring emerging activities and threats.  
Establishing legally binding agreements are very critical in governing large-scale common 
properties. When it comes to governing global commons, this is no different. However, 
geopolitical interests and various conflicts between states often challenge international law 
makers to reach an effective and applicable consensus on a global level. Perhaps all of the 
global domains being reviewed throughout this paper somehow suffer from the same 
problem – lack of functioning legally binding agreements. For instance, it can be argued that 
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the sea regime is the most effective and applicable regime amongst the global commons 
governance regimes in terms of its historical and institutional development. Yet, its legal 
regime has been undermined by major powers.  
The Arctic Council on the other hand, lacks the regulatory authority to impose legally binding 
measures. Therefore, past and present attempts to address problems occurring in the Arctic 
environment with the existing UNCLOS’ provisions have been insufficient. Existing legally 
binding agreements of the OST regime are often ignored by the majority of the spacefaring 
countries. For example, the Moon Treaty has only been ratified by seven countries as of 
January 2018 (UN, 2018). This is partly because of the other common deficits previously 
mentioned, such as lack of clarity and lack of regulative and institutional arrangements within 
the governance regime.  
Consequently, this study argues that if these key governance deficits are not addressed 
successfully, political and legal problems within global commons regimes are highly likely to 
remain unresolved. Accordingly, environmental problems such as overfishing in oceans, 
melting in the Arctic, and space debris in outer space are expected to become self-sustaining 
environmental tragedies. Yet, as Nobel award winner Elinor Ostrom argues, “the tragedy of 
the commons” is not inevitable (Ostrom, et al., 2003). Such that, a large number of systematic 
multi-disciplinary studies have proven that a variety of adaptive governance regimes have 
been effectively established to control commons and resources therein (Ostrom, 2010) 
(Stern, et al., 2010). Despite the emerging problems mentioned in the Antarctic environment, 
the Antarctic treaty system has shown a similar model in terms of global governance that has 
proven to be successful overall (Convey, et al., 2012). Therefore, it is possible to study global 
commons governance from a commons perspective, and that a set of design principles 
offered by Ostrom and her colleagues can be defined and conducted for global commons 
regimes in order to mitigate large-scale environmental tragedies (Stern, 2011).  
5.2. Elaborating Ostrom’s General Principles for Global Commons Governance  
Even though principles provided by Ostrom (2003) are largely applicable to global and 
regional problems, some principles may not be identical to those implemented in local 
governance (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, eight principles also need to be discussed in terms of 
their applicability to global commons, particularly to outer space.  
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To begin with, clearly defining the boundaries of resources and user groups is not a feasible 
practice for the majority of global commons regimes, as Stern emphasises (2011). As this 
research has shown previously, there have been many territorial disputes between states in 
global arenas. Although it is feasible to consider international jurisdictions as boundaries, only 
establishing certain geographical limits would not be enough to prevent conflicts between 
parties when it comes to governing resources. Territorial disputes in the Arctic Sea are clear 
examples of the impracticality of implementing boundaries for resources.  
However, despite its environmental vastness, the outer space commons compromises of 
spatial resources which are now very limited and valuable. Developments in space traffic 
management show that there are certain orbital boundaries for satellites to perform certain 
tasks such as navigation, communication, or earth observation. In fact, as discussed earlier, 
the ITU allocates GEO slots for states by assessing orbital parameters (ITU, 2018). Today, more 
than ever, spatial commons need to be shared carefully between user groups within definite 
boundaries. In order to achieve this principle in outer space commons, certain governance 
requirements need to be met. As Ostrom identifies in key requirements for environmental 
governance (2003), providing information and inducing rule compliance are also very critical 
in governing orbital sources. Implementing effective information sharing between the ITU and 
satellite owners, as well as applying sanctions against those who do not act in accordance 
with the standards set by international law, would probably result in better governance. 
These requirements also apply to the principle of applying graduated sanctions for violations. 
Devising rules that are congruent with ecological conditions was not a priority in specifying 
and enforcing rules until the late 20th century (Stern, 2011). This has changed with the 
acceleration of information sharing and communication and with the significant increase in 
global awareness towards the ecological conditions in global commons. The UN Fish Stock 
Agreement of 1995 and Paris Climate Accord of 2016 are two of the regulatory instruments 
developed to enforce rules that account for specific environmental conditions. Similar 
approaches can be made for the outer space commons when the problems therein are clearly 
defined and backed with effective institutional arrangements that take the space 
environment into account and monitor compliance accordingly. Moreover, in parallel to 
devising new rules, updating existing agreements to keep pace with technological 
developments can improve the quality of governance. This is of significant importance for 
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outer space governance as the emerging activities such as space tourism and asteroid mining 
pose new challenges to the OST regime.  
Holding monitors accountable to users is an important principle for global commons 
governance, however, it is very problematic to implement for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
there is a continuing presence of conflicts of interest between major users which can 
negatively impact monitoring activities. This is primarily visible in Arctic waters where states 
are engaged in aggressive military actions in order to claim natural resources. Secondly, 
increasing involvement of commercial and private actors globally may affect monitoring 
activities. Finally, to effectively prevent non-compliance, monitoring activities should be 
conducted. Therefore, there is a need for an independent body to conduct monitoring 
activities. Due to its specific nature, land-based activities related to outer space are very 
limited compared to other global commons. In-orbit missions, on the other hand, require 
constant monitoring in order to avoid potential collisions and radio frequency interferences. 
Stern’s (2011, p. 221) updated version of the principle, “Establishing independent monitoring 
of the resource and its use that is accountable to the interested and affected parties”, is more 
applicable to global commons governance. 
Involving interested parties in informed discussion of rules is a foundational principle within 
the system of international relations17. However, ensuring meaningful and effective 
participation within a highly diverse society is a major challenge. In fact, as Stern argues, the 
benefits and losses of degradation fall to largely different stakeholders which often result in 
various disputes in any specific governance setting (Stern, 2011). Moreover, the international 
law-making process is quite slow as participants often have entirely different interests with 
regards to regulatory and institutional arrangements. In general, reaching an agreement takes 
years of negotiations. OST treaties, for instance, were agreed upon following years of 
discussions within the Legal Subcommittee. At this point, a large body of research suggests 
that encouraging states and other stakeholders to adopt, harmonise, and change are crucial 
requirements for effective governance in global settings (Dietz & Stern, 2008) (Ostrom, et al., 
2003). Moreover, it is widely argued that ensuring equal participation of public, commercial, 
and private organisations is a vital part of effective rule development processes in global 
                                                     
17 COPUOS Legal and Technical Subcommittees, UNCLOS committees, the Arctic Council, and various other UN 
bodies include numerous stakeholders from public and private institutions.   
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commons governance (Dietz & Stern, 2008). Establishing such a participatory system in the 
OST regime would enhance the legal and scientific discussions and yield long-term 
cooperation in confronting the space debris problem.  
Allocating authority to allow for adaptive governance at multiple levels from local to global is 
related to overcoming the collective action problem in the provision of governance in global 
commons. First offered by Ostrom et al. (1961) later elaborated as the polycentric approach 
(Ostrom, 2010), this principle is aimed at preventing the chaotic system of governance 
resulting from high number of governments. As discussed previously, the existing governance 
arrangements within the sea regime indicate a similar chaotic system when dealing with the 
fishery, whaling, and shipping activities in the oceans where mandates and authorities cause 
serious legal and operational problems (GOC, 2015). It is proposed that the “polycentric 
system” allows participants to have more efficient task distribution and cooperation in 
managing natural resources (Weschler, 1968). Therefore, Ostrom’s polycentric approach 
(2010) represents an appropriate governance system for global regimes with multiple 
governing authorities at different levels, instead of having monocentric units. A polycentric 
model for outer space governance can be established when national, regional, and 
international space legislation and agents are sufficiently integrated and have substantial 
regulatory and organisational harmony. Moreover, other public and private organisations 
need to be engaged in different levels of governance.  
Employing mixtures of institutional types refers to having complex, redundant, and nested 
institutional variety in global governance (Ostrom, et al., 2003). Single-level centralised 
strategies for governing large resources have shown to cause environmental degradation 
(Berkes, et al., 2000). Having institutional variety as a part of a global governance, to increase 
information sharing, monitoring, induce compliance, and dispute resolution, is fundamental 
for global governance. The challenge of establishing such “institutional combinations” as 
Stern describes (2011), is finding an appropriate organisational structure that can effectively 
implement the other design principles previously discussed. As such, the last principle of 
establishing low-cost mechanisms for conflict resolution is directly embedded within this 
principle. In fact, although all of these principles are inter-related, institutional and regulatory 
arrangements comprise the two fundamental aspects of every governance system. Moreover, 
such a functioning institutional system must be integrated and adopted within regional, 
61 
 
national, and local institutions (Stern, 2011). Establishing polycentric institutional variety is a 
huge challenge for outer space governance considering the current diverse state of space 
cooperation. However, it is necessary in successfully confronting the space debris issue. 
To conclude, Ostrom’s principles for global resource governance present profound shifts for 
the global commons regimes. Previously identified key governance deficits can be dealt with 
by utilising her principles. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account emerging 
technological and scientific developments in the implementation of these principles. As 
Ostrom stresses (2003, p. 1910), “as the human footprint on the Earth enlarges, humanity is 
challenged to develop and deploy understanding of large scale commons governance quickly 
enough to avoid the large-scale tragedies that will otherwise ensue”. Space debris is one of 
these tragedies that are created as a result of rapid human expansion in space that took place 
over the last five decades. Today, the consequences of this irregular and unnatural expansion 
are threatening global welfare. This research has attempted to review this tragedy based on 
the foundation of the overall state of global commons regimes and similar environmental 
tragedies occurring therein. In light of the discussed principles, it concludes with a number of 
policy proposals aimed at addressing the tragedy of outer space commons. 
5.3. Cleaning up the Junk: Policy Proposals for Space Debris 
It can be argued that governing the space debris problem poses fundamental challenges of 
legal, economic, and scientific dimensions. First, there is a lack of binding international 
agreement on the space debris issue (Imburgia, 2011). Second, remediation and mitigation 
processes of space debris are extremely costly (Wiedmann, et al., 2004). Third, substantial 
scientific advancements are required in active debris removal methods in order to prevent 
debris collisions from cascading (Castronuovo, 2011). In addition, a lack of institutional and 
regulative arrangements amongst these dimensions is prevailing within the entire 
international space debris regime (Pusey, 2010). In the light of aforementioned, this research 
recommends that (1) a binding agreement concerning the issue of space debris should be 
established; (2) access to space should be taxed and a dedicated fund for orbital preservation 
should be established; and (3) an international space agency under the auspices of the UN 
should be established. 
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5.3.1. The Space Debris Treaty  
As discussed previously, the existing UN treaties on outer space are incapable of dealing with 
the problem of space debris. Although some argue that the liability and registration 
conventions should be reformed and updated (Roberts, 1992) (Lamperitus, 1991) (Pusey, 
2010) and that a new treaty would be an impractical option for addressing the orbital debris 
issue (Mirmina, 2005), this study argues that the first and most important method to confront 
the tragedy is to establish a legal regime that clearly defines, effectively regulates, and strictly 
obliges the mitigation and removal of orbital debris. In doing so, the Legal Subcommittee of 
COPUOS must engage in extensive dialogues with various stakeholders including state 
representatives, non-governmental organisations, national and regional space agencies, 
commercial and private space firms, and scientific and technological institutions in 
establishing the treaty. The Committee should also emphasise and prioritise the ecological 
conditions when devising rules as encouraged by Ostrom’s principles.  
The definition of the term space debris is of great significance in dealing with the tragedy. 
Therefore, the treaty should define the term space debris in order to clarify the issue of 
liability and to resolve the disputes that emerge due to the absence of an applicable term. 
Colonel Imburgia’s definition on the term can be utilised as it encompasses all forms of space 
debris present in the orbital environment (2011, p. 621):  
“all man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-
entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional, regardless of whether the debris is 
created accidentally or intentionally; the term includes, but is not limited to, 
fragments of older satellites and rocket boosters resulting from explosions or 
collisions, as well as any non-functional space object, such as dead satellites, spent 
rocket stages or other launch vehicles, or component parts thereof”. 
Existing non-binding space debris mitigation guidelines18 should be utilised when 
implementing the provisions of the new treaty, this includes the limitation of debris 
production from new launches, the issue of compensation for damages caused by space 
debris, removal of space debris created, information sharing, and other measures. Moreover, 
                                                     




the new treaty should address the inadequacies within the 1972 Liability Convention and the 
1975 Registration Convention. For instance, it should require parties to exchange tracking 
data related to space debris, a provision which the existing legal framework failed to provide.  
The treaty should have necessary provisions and mechanisms with respect to enforcement 
and dispute resolution. Similar to the Maritime and Antarctic regime, the Space Debris Treaty 
should require state parties to enforce provisions and resolve disputes peacefully in 
compliance with the UN Charter and through international courts (Imburgia, 2011). The treaty 
should limit the military activities in the orbital environment and categorise, regulate, and 
control existing and emerging space activities in space such as asteroid mining and space 
tourism. Finally, the treaty should establish necessary provisions for the taxation of space 
activities and for the establishment of a dedicated fund for outer space maintenance, as well 
as the international space agency and its organisational structure and activities. 
5.3.2. Taxing Access to Outer Space and the Orbital Conservation Fund  
Similar proposals have been made within the literature to tax access to outer space  (Pusey, 
2010) and to establish a fund in order to conduct scientific experiments and remediation 
activities to clean up the orbital environment from space debris (Williamson, 2006) (Sundahl, 
2000). As the current debris situation poses great financial and technical challenges, it is 
widely argued that applying tax and creating a fund for scientific research and debris removal 
missions would be considered less burdensome for states (Imburgia, 2011). The system would 
operate similar to how highways and other public transport services are maintained. Users 
would be taxed for benefiting from the services and the collected funds would be used to 
maintain the environment and the infrastructure therein. Accordingly, for every launch, 
depending on the quality and quantity of the mission, states and private companies should 
be taxed by the International Space Agency.  
As Pusey suggests (2010), by means of creating inducements for environmentally conscious 
design and engineering, the tax would change based on mitigation procedures implemented 
and applied after the launch by the responsible satellite operator. For instance, satellite 
operators that comply with the Space Debris Law might receive a reduced tax expense, 
otherwise the operators and responsible state would receive higher tax liability. In this way, 
the tax system would establish a fair setting in collecting tax revenue and would encourage 
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and eventually increase responsible conduct in space affairs. The International Space Agency, 
created by the Space Debris Treaty, would be responsible for collecting and maintaining tax 
revenues. Collected revenues would be redistributed into scientific research, education 
programmes for space situational awareness, and development processes, eventually 
contributing to mitigation and ADR projects. Moreover, with the unprecedented growth of 
commercial space firms, such as SpaceX and Boeing, the increasing number of activities can 
create more funds to enhance efforts to achieve long-term sustainability of outer space by 
utilising and improving space traffic management activities and information exchange 
programmes.   
5.3.3. International Space Agency  
There are various studies conducted on the creation of environmental regimes which point 
out the necessity of a global mechanism to unify existing separated instruments and 
experimental knowledge in order to achieve sustainable development and environmental 
protection (Young & Osherenko, 1990) (Haas, 1989). As the organisational body of the Space 
Debris Treaty, an International Space Agency (ISA) would be of great importance for not only 
achieving safe, secure, and sustainable access to outer space but also for global welfare and 
development. Such an important organisational body should be established under the 
auspices of the UN and should be comprised of national and regional space agency 
representatives, UN officials as well as representatives from other commercial and 
international space organisations and institutions. A great example of such cooperation is the 
International Space Station which has been operating for almost two decades. The same level 
of dedication and ambition should be ensured when establishing the ISA in order to offer 
credible protection and cooperation in the outer space environment.  
The presence of such a unified international agency to coordinate and guide international 
negotiations, compliance monitoring, and dispute resolution processes is crucial for a 
successful space debris governing regime. Moreover, the agency would provide a polycentric 
governance system that can benefit national and regional space agencies and also provide 
critical lessons to the agency from local experiences when dealing with space affairs. As David 
Tan suggests (2000), the agency should have a truly inter-disciplinary approach that includes 
expertise from the fields of science, technology, health, economics, international security, 
law, and other areas. The contributions from these fields would play a profound role in 
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shaping the space regime formation, particularly in developing and implementing global 
policy actions. In addition to having the financial responsibility for collecting and 
redistributing tax revenues, the agency would be responsible for making recommendations 
to the UN to adopt additional binding rules and enforcement mechanisms to the proposed 
space debris treaty.  
Finally, a similar agency model proposed by David Tan suggests a number of guidelines that 
can be utilised in order to increase the effectiveness of the ISA (2000, p. 214):  
“(1) the formulation of a clear mission objective, agreed to by the signatories of space 
debris treaty; (2) the acceptance of the role of the ISA in an organisational structure 
that reflects the interest, power, and capabilities of member states; (3) the 
minimisation of bureaucratic inefficiency through the establishment of an able and 
professional Secretariat within ISA to coordinate transnational scientific, technical, 
technological, and legal matters maintaining at all times an apolitical agenda; (4) the 
authority to engage in research on the effects of all space activities on the outer space 
environment; (5) the authority to recommend, from time to time and without need to 
achieve consensus, relevant principles to be included in a protocol of the space debris 
treaty.” 
5.4. Conclusion  
Achieving the long-term sustainability of outer space depends on the international 
community’s reaction to the many challenges confronting it and reflecting on the lessons 
from the global commons on Earth, so as to avoid making the same mistakes, as detailed in 
this research. The tragedies occurring in global environments require effective global 
responses. The proposed policy recommendations are aimed at resolving the key governance 
challenges in the legal, economic, and scientific fields by emphasising the significance of 
international organisational and regulatory arrangements. These recommendations are 
utilised with the lessons derived from Ostrom’s principles discussed in this paper. In this 
regard, an international treaty on space environment protection, a financial programme in 
managing the cost of debris removal programmes and maintenance of spatial resources, and 
an international space agency to coordinate these fields and provide substantial cooperation 
between space actors, are offered as fundamental steps. On the basis of these 
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recommendations, a course of action can be plotted to, at the very least, further mitigate the 
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